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Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The
Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma
Some thirty years ago in the landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois 1
Justice Hugo Black declared that "[t]here can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has." 2 Since that decision, the rights of indigent defendants in the
criminal justice system3 have received frequent attention from the
Supreme Court. Griffin established the right to a free trial transcript
for appeal. Subsequent cases required the waiver of a filing fee for
appeals, 4 and established the right to state-supplied counsel at trial, 5
on appeal, 6 in misdemeanor cases, 7 and, under some circumstances, in
probation revocation hearings. 8
Even when an indigent defendant is provided with counsel, however, justice is not always done. As Judge Jerome Frank of the Second
Circuit pointed out in an often-quoted passage, it may also be vital
that the defendant have access to the assistance of experts or
investigators:
The best lawyer in the world cannot competently defend an accused person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to the defense,
1. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
2. 351 U.S. at 19.
3. In 1971, according to F.B.I. reports, of some seven million adult felony and nontraffic
misdemeanor arrests in the United States, almost 3.4 million of the defendants were indigent and
required appointed counsel. N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 3 n.4
(1982). In 1963, the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Fed·
eral Criminal Justice cited estimates that about sixty percent of the defendants in state and federal courts were unable to afford counsel. REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITIEE
ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16 (1963) [hereinafter cited as POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE]. Another estimate is that "[i]n
most jurisdictions, approximately 60-70 percent of all felony defendants and 30-40 percent of all
misdemeanor defendants will be classified as indigent." H. KERPER, INTRODUCTION TO THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 279 (J. Israel 2d ed. 1979).
4. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court first recognized a right to state·
supplied counsel in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Decided under the "fundamental
fairness" analysis of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, Powell did not create a
systematic right to appointed counsel for all indigent defendants. That was made clear a decade
later by Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (lack of counsel did not result in denial of due
process where no special circumstances made counsel necessary). Meanwhile, Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938), had established the right to appointed counsel in federal cases under the
sixth amendment. It was this sixth amendment right which the Court applied to the states in
Gideon as part of the "selective incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment.
6. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
7. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), limited
this right to those misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is actually imposed.
8. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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e.g., if the defendant cannot pay the fee of an investigator to find a pivotal missing witness or a necessary document, or that of an expert accountant or mining engineer or chemist.... In such circumstances, if the
government does not supply the funds, justice is denied the poor - and
represents but an upper-bracket privilege. 9

And as early as 1929 Justice (then Chief Judge) Benjamin Cardozo
had noted that "upon the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or
forgery, experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense .... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is
unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of
those against him." 10 It will hardly be disputed that, as society and
the legal system have come increasingly to rely on science, the importance of the expert 11 has only become greater.
The gradual expansion of the rights of indigent defendants, especially during the 1960s, increasingly brought with it, therefore, the
recognition that one right essential to a fair trial was that of the assistance of nonlawyer experts in appropriate cases. 12 On the federal
level, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 13 following the recommendation of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, 14 provided for "investigative,
expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense." 15 The
American Bar Association used much the same language in its 1968
Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services. 16 Scholarly com9. United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (1956) (Frank, J., dissenting).
10. Reilly v. Barry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929).
11. As used in this Note, the term "expert" includes not only the professional who testifies at
trial as an expert witness, but also other nonlawyers, such as investigators, who assist in the
development of information or planning of strategy in the pretrial and trial stages.
12. The problem for indigents is magnified by the difficulty of obtaining expert services on a
pro bono basis. According to the director of a Florida volunteer defender organization: "Competent lawyers often volunteer their help, but psychiatrists rarely do. Over the years, I have found
hundreds of attorneys who have been willing to volunteer millions of dollars of their time to these
defendants. I have found only three free shrinks . . . ." Sherrill, In Florida, Insanity is No
Defense, 239 NATION 537, 555 (1984) (quoting Scharlette Holdman, of the Florida Clearing
House for Justice).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982).
14. The "Allen Committee," so called after its chairperson Professor Francis A. Allen, concluded that in many federal cases "the provision of adequate representation requires that a range
of services, in addition to the appointment of counsel, be made available to the defense. These
services include those of pre-trial investigation and those of experts such as psychiatrists, accountants, and other specialists." POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note
3, at 39.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982). On the practical operation of the statute, see generally
Oaks, Obtaining Compensation and Defense Services Under the Federal Criminal Justice Act, in 1
CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES ch. 7 (R. Cipes ed. 1969). The question of when such services
are "necessary" is discussed in Part V infra.
16. STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES§ 1.5 (1968). The ABA's
Advisory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Functions, which drew up these standards,
was chaired by then Circuit Judge Warren E. Burger. Essentially the same standard is carried
over into the ABA's 1980 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE§ 5-1.4 (2d ed. 1980).
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mentators nearly unanimously called for recognition of the indigent's
constitutional right to expert assistance where necessary. 17 And most
states, either by statute or judicial decision, provided for expert services in certain circumstances. 18
Curiously, however, the Supreme Court maintained a thirty-two
year silence on the issue. Its ambiguous 1953 decision in United States
ex rel. Smith v. Baldi 19 remained its final word on the question until
1985.20 While in the late 1960s and early 1970s the rapid expansion of
the Griffin equal protection principle2 1 made it appear virtually inevitable that the constitutional right to appointed experts would soon be
recognized, 22 the Burger Court "put on the brakes" 23 in 1974 with its
decision in Ross v. Moffitt, 24 refusing to recognize a constitutional
17. See, e.g., Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional
and Statutory Rights ofIndigents, 51 CIN. L. R.Ev. 574 (1982); Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent
Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 647 (1973); Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational
Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 632 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense]; Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counselfor Indigent
Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to Aid];
Note, Criminal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to Independent Psychiatrist, 7 TULSA L.J. 137
(1971); Note, An Indigent Criminal Defendant's Right to a Psychiatric Expert, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REV. 481 [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to a Psychiatric Expert]; Comment, Assistance in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Defendants: The Need For; The Lack Of; The Right To, 16 VILL. L.
REV. 323 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Assistance in Addition to Counsel].
18. For a list of relevant statutes and cases from forty-one states, see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 78 n.4 (1985); see also N. LEFSTEIN, supra note 3, at apps. B, C, D (surveying state
provisions for defense services); Note, An Indigent's Constitutional Right to Expert Psychiatric
Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957, 965-67 (1985) (discussing variations in statutory
schemes).
19. 344 U.S. 561 (1953). Relying on McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951), the
Baldi Court rejected the claim that the state had a constitutional duty to appoint a psychiatrist to
make a pretrial examination of the defendant. The Court emphasized, however, that in the case
before it a court-appointed psychiatrist had examined the defendant and testified as to his sanity
at the time of the offense. 344 U.S. at 568. Thus, it is not clear whether under Baldi an indigent
defendant had no right at all of access to a psychiatric expert, or whether such a right was merely
limited to an examination by a "neutral" expert. Baldi, in any case, was decided well before the
Court began its systematic expansion of the rights of indigent defendants. It was certainly "severely undercut" by the Court's decisions after Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See
Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1390 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979) (Wisdom, J.).
20. In 1963 the Court granted certiorari on this question in Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586
(1963), only to remand the case when Texas provided a psychiatric examination and offered to
grant the defendant a new trial. Eighteen years later the question was again presented by a
petition for certiorari in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 20-22, Eddings. In granting certiorari, however, the Court limited consideration to
another issue presented by the petitioner. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981) (granting
certiorari). While the Supreme Court was silent, numerous state and lower federal courts dealt
with the issue of expert services for indigent defendants - with a wide range of results. See
Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970 & Supp. 1985).
21. See text at notes 64-65 infra.
22. See Kamisar, Poverty, Equality and Criminal Procedure: From Griffin v. Illinois and
Douglas v. California to Ross v. Moffitt, in NATIONAL COLLEGE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK 1-79, 1-94 (1977).
23. Id. at 1-97.
24. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).

Note -

May 1986]

Expert Services

1329

right to appointed counsel for discretionary review by a state supreme
court. 25
A decade later, the break.through on the issue of the indigent defendant's constitutional right to state-supplied expert services may
have come with the Court's 1985 decision in Ake v. Oklahoma. 26 In
an opinion joined by all but two Justices, 27 the Court held that an
indigent defendant whose sanity at the time of the offense is to be a
significant factor at trial is entitled to the assistance of a state-supplied
psychiatrist for his defense. 28
This Note attempts to define the boundaries of the indigent criminal defendant's constitutional right to expert assistance, in the light of
Ake v. Oklahoma. Part I briefly reviews the Ake decision and examines its constitutional background. Part II inquires into Ake's implications for experts other than psychiatrists and in contexts other than
the insanity defense, arguing that the principles that guided the Ake
decision have validity well beyond the facts of that case. Part III asks
whether the Ake doctrine should be limited to capital cases. Rejecting
such a limitation, it concludes that the right to expert assistance
should extend as far as the right to counsel. Part IV examines the role
of the expert, arguing that she must be a "defense consultant" rather
than a "neutral expert." Part V addresses the threshold showing a
defendant must make in order to obtain access to an expert, proposing
several tests under which the right to expert assistance can be
evaluated.
I.

AKE AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

A.

Ake v. Oklahoma

Glen Burton Ake was tried and convicted in the District Court of
Canadian County, Oklahoma, for the brutal and senseless murder of a
husband and wife and the wounding of their two children. Captured
along with his accomplice in Colorado a month after the crime, Ake
made a detailed, forty-four page confession. The "facts" of the case
were thus not in dispute. 29 The only issue at trial was Ake's sanity.
25. See Kamisar, supra note 22, at 1-97 to 1-110. On Moffitt, see notes 66-73 infra and
accompanying text.
26. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
27. See note 54 infra.
28. 470 U.S. at 83. For further discussion of the Ake decision, see notes 29-55 infra and
accompanying text.
29. In his dissenting opinion Justice Rehnquist describes the crime in some detail. 470 U.S.
at 88. Rehnquist's account, excerpted from Oklahoma's Supreme Court brief, see Brief of Respondent at 3-10, Ake, was apparently aimed at portraying the robbery and murder as a rationally planned act ("Petitioner Ake and his codefendant Hatch quit their jobs on an oil field rig in
October 1979, borrowed a car, and went looking for a location to burglarize." 470 U.S. at 88), to
support his argument that there was no doubt as to Ake's sanity. See 470 U.S. at 90-91.
Whatever the horror of the crime, however, it is doubtful that it simply resulted from a rational
calculus. Ake's confession makes clear that he committed the crime under the influence of con-
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At arraignment, the judge found Ake's behavior so "bizarre" that
he ordered sua sponte a psychiatric examination. 3° Following a
month-long state hospital examination of his competency to stand
trial, Ake was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic,31 held incompetent to stand trial, and committed to the state hospital. Six weeks
later, however, he had been rendered competent through massive
doses of the antipsychotic drug Thorazine. 32
At a pretrial conference, Ake's court-appointed attorney announced his intention to raise a defense of insanity. During his three
months at the state hospital, Ake had never been examined with regard to his sanity at the time of the offense; because he was indigent,
his attorney asked the trial court to appoint a psychiatrist for such an
examination. Relying on United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 33 the
court rejected the request. 34 At trial, Ake's counsel called three psychiatrists who had examined the defendant; none of them, however,
siderable quantities of cocaine, marijuana, whiskey, and beer he consumed that day, apparently
as a result of an emotional crisis set off by his girlfriend's desertion. See Brief of Respondent,
app. A at 3a-50a; cf. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120,
133 n.20 (1985) (arguing that Rehnquist misunderstood the nature of Ake's illness, and that
Ake's "apparent coherence after the crime was consistent with the diagnosis of chronic paranoid
schizophrenia") [hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court, 1984 Term].
30. Information on the pretrial and trial proceedings is drawn from Ake, 410 U.S. at 70-73.
31. At Ake's competency hearing, the examining psychiatrist testified that Ake was
a psychotic ... his psychiatric diagnosis was that of paranoid schizophrenia - chronic, with
exacerbation, that is with current upset, and that in addition • • • he is dangerous. • • •
[B]ecause of the severity of his mental illness and because of the intensities of his rage, his
poor control, his delusions, he requires a maximum security facility within - I believe the State Psychiatric Hospital system.
470 U.S. at 71.
32. Apparently because of the drug treatment, Ake stared vacantly ahead throughout the
trial, remaining mute and refusing to speak with his attorneys. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 6 (Okin.
Crim. App. 1983). Ake also challenged, before the Supreme Court, the constitutionality of trying him while so drugged, but the Court did not reach this question in its decision. See 410 U.S.
at 74 n.2.
33. 344 U.S. 561 (1953); see note 19 supra.
34. 470 U.S. at 72. The court's decision was fully in accord with Oklahoma law, which did
not allow trial courts any discretion to provide funds for defense experts. See Amicus Curiae
Brief of the Public Defender of Oklahoma County et al. at 4-9, Ake. That not only defense
attorneys but also some Oklahoma courts questioned the constitutionality of this practice is indi·
cated by the following colloquy, from a 1982 case, on a defense motion for an independent psy·
chological evaluation:
THE COURT: You can't hire •.. investigators and you can't hire experts and all that
and you talked me into - one day of ruling that again. And I think you're right on the law.
And I knew - I know you're right.
But the trouble of it is, there's three fellows out there on the State Capitol that say that
that's not the law. And you took it out there and they overruled •.. me •..• And I think
they're flirting with dynamite ....
. . . Be overruled....
MR. RAVITZ: For the record, Judge, I would like to state that I don't have any funds.
My client's indigent ....
THE COURT: Well, for whatever its [sic] worth, Ravitz ..• I agreed with you a year
ago, I agree with you now ...•
. . . I cannot legally give you those funds. And what the Supreme Court of the United
States is going to say about it one of these days is another ball game. But I can't do
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was able to testify on the issue of Ake's sanity at the time of the offense. Thus, Ake was able to present no expert testimony in support
of his defense ofinsanity. 35 The jury rejected his claim of insanity and
found him guilty on all counts. At the sentencing proceeding, the
prosecution relied on testimony elicited from the psychiatrists, on
cross-examination during the guilt phase, that Ake was a danger to
society. Ake was able to present no expert evidence to rebut this testimony. He was sentenced to death. 36
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Ake's conviction and death sentence, 37 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice Marshall based his opinion for the Court on "the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness." 38 After tracing the Court's decisions expanding the rights of indigent defendants over thirty years, 39 Marshall concluded that the state had an
obligation to supply the indigent defendant with the "basic tools of an
that. And the Court of Criminal Appeals told me that you can't do this. I've got to follow
them....
THE COURT: You've got to convince them [the Court of Criminal Appeals] out there.
That's who you've got to convince.
MR. RAVITZ: I've tried.
THE COURT: Take it on up to the Supreme Court of the United States....
Id. at app. B.
35. While Oklahoma theoretically admitted lay testimony on the issue of insanity, the use of
the M'Naghten "right-wrong" test, as well as a presumption of sanity which the defendant could
overcome only by making a prima facie case oflegal insanity, combined to render lay testimony
virtually useless. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Public Defender of Oklahoma County et al. at
10-17, Ake (citing cases); Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 21
TULSA L.J. 121, 136-41 (1985) (citing cases). In light of this consistent Oklahoma practice of
finding lay testimony insufficient to overcome the presumption of sanity, Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting remark that Ake had called no lay witnesses to testify on his sanity, 470 U.S. at 90, is
particularly inapt.
For a more general discussion of the difficulty of establishing insanity by lay testimony, see A.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 124-25 (1967) ("In practical terms, a successful defense
without expert testimony will be made only in cases so extreme, or so compelling in sympathy for
the defendant, that the prosecutor is unlikely to bring them at all.").
36. 470 U.S. at 72-73.
37. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). The court rejected nineteen defense
exceptions, including Ake's claim that he had a right to a court-appointed psychiatrist. Its complete discussion of the issue was as follows: "We have held numerous times that, the unique
nature of capital cases notwithstanding, the State does not have the responsibility of providing
such services to indigents charged with capital crimes. Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Oki. Cr.
1980); and cases cited therein." 663 P.2d at 6.
38. 470 U.S. at 76. Because it was able to decide the issue on due process grounds, the Court
did not examine the applicability of the equal protection clause or the sixth amendment. 470
U.S. at 87 n.13.
39. The Court cited Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to a trial transcript for
appeal); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (filing fee for appeal must be waived); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (right to counsel on first direct appeal as of right); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)
(assistance of counsel must be effective); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (same);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (same); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1
(1981) (right to state-paid blood tests in a "quasi-criminal" paternity action).
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adequate defense or appeal." 40 To determine whether access to a psychiatrist was such a "basic tool," the Court applied the familiar threeprong balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge. 41 The Mathews test considers (1) the "private interest" which would be affected by the state's
action, (2) the "governmental interest" affected by application of the
additional safeguard, and (3) "the probable value of the additional or
substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards ~re
not provided."42
The Court disposed summarily of the first two factors. The criminal defendant's interest in his life or liberty was "almost uniquely com40. 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
41. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Mathews test is used essentially in administrative law, and
its application to criminal cases is rare. But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984)
(pretrial detention of juveniles); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983) (prison disciplinary
procedures); see also the "quasi-criminal" case of Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (paternity action). Ake breaks new ground in using the Mathews test in the context of' a criminal trial.
The Mathews approach of using a balancing test to take account of the cost of due process
protections is controversial. For criticism of Mathews, see Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors i11
Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 28 (1976); Rubin, Due Process a11d the Admi11istrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1136-44 (1984). On the dangers inherent in any balancing
test, due to the easy manipulability of the factors to be balanced and the difficulty of comparing
them, see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Frantz,
Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Me11delson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 746-49
(1963). As Professor Rubin has pointed out, "The Court's frequent answer is to 'balance' or
'weigh' the various factors. This reliance upon 'weight,' which is a useful approach for dealing
with bananas, leaves something to be desired where factors such as those in Mathews are concerned." Rubin, supra, at 1138. On the other hand, due process concepts may be more amenable
to the balancing of various interests, including the cost to society. A classic characterization
notes that due process "at any given time includes those procedures that are fair and feasible in
the light of then existing values and capabilities." Schaefer, Federalism and State Crimi11al Pro·
cedure, 70 HARV. L. R.Ev. l, 6 (1956) (emphasis added). Such an understanding of due process
would seem to invite weighing the burden on society, in determining what process is due in a
given situation. Generally, the Court has indeed been more willing to take account of costs when
the more open-ended clauses of the Constitution are involved. See W. LAFAVE & J, ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.8(d) (1985).
In the area of indigent defendants' rights, an increased willingness to consider cost appears to
be part of the Court's general retreat from Griffin-Douglas equal protection doctrine; see notes
66-73 infra and accompanying text. Compare Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97
(1971) ("Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and the interests
of society ...• The State's fiscal interest is ... irrelevant."), with Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
373 (1979) ("[A]ny extension [of the right to counsel] would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States."). See also Elson, Bala11ci11g
Costs in Constitutional Construction: The Burger Court's Expansive New Approach, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 160, 183-86 (1979). Justice Stevens has argued that the Mathews balancing test is
appropriate only to property cases and has no place where a deprivation of liberty is involved.
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59-60 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even
if one accepts this view, however, Ake's introduction of the Mathews analysis into the area of
criminal law may be a positive step when compared to Scott - which considered costs as an
absolute value and refused to balance them against the interests of the individual defendant. See
Elson, supra, at 184; Nowak, Foreword - Due Process Methodology in the Posti11corporatio11
World, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 408-09 (1979).
42. 470 U.S. at 77.
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pelling,"43 while the state's fiscal interest in denying the defendant the
assistance of a psychiatrist was "not substantial," both in absolute
terms44 and "in light of the compelling interest of both the State and
the individual in accurate dispositions." 45 The bulk of the Court's discussion was devoted to the third prong, focusing on "the pivotal role
that psychiatry has come to play in criminal proceedings"46 and the
important functions performed for the defense by a psychiatric expert.47 It found that "the potential accuracy of the jury's determination is . . . dramatically enhanced" by the provision of a psychiatric
expert for the defense. 48 Given this determination, as well as the state
and individual interests in accurate proceedings, the opinion concluded that "the State's interest in its fisc must yield." 4 9 Thus, the
Court held that
when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the
time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a
minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. 50

Turning to the special case of the sentencing phase in a capital
proceeding, the Court held that "when the State presents psychiatric
evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness" as an aggravating
factor, it must provide him with "access to a psychiatric examination
on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase." 51
Finally, the Court addressed its thirty-two year old precedent of
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 52 so often invoked to deny an
indigent defendant's right to expert assistance. First distinguishing
Baldi on the grounds that in that case "neutral psychiatrists" had in
fact examined the defendant and testified to his sanity, the Court went
on virtually to overrule Baldi:
[O]ur disagreement with the State's reliance on [Baldi] is more fundamental. That case was decided at a time when indigent defendants in
43. 470 U.S. at 78.
44. The Court noted that the federal government and many states already provided psychiatric assistance for indigent defendants. 470 U.S. at 78 & n.4 (citing statutes and judicial decisions
of 41 states).
45. 470 U.S. at 79.
46. 470 U.S. at 79.
47. 470 U.S. at 80-82
48. 470 U.S. at 83.
49. 470 U.S. at 83.
50. 470 U.S. at 83. The Court limited its holding, however, by specifying that the defendant
was not entitled to a psychiatrist of his choice, and that implementation of the right to a psychiatrist would be left to the states. 470 U.S. at 83. On this issue, see notes 183-89 infra and accompanying text.
51. 470 U.S. at 83-84..
52. 344 U.S. 561 (1953); see note 19 supra.
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state courts had no constitutional right to even the presence of counsel. ... [A]nd we would surely be remiss to ignore the extraordinarily
enhanced role of psychiatry in criminal law today. Shifts in all these
areas since the time of [Baldi] convince us that the opinion in that case
was addressed to altogether different variables, and that we are not limited by it in considering whether fundamental fairness today requires a
different result. s3

Applying its discussion to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the denial of a state-supplied psychiatrist at both the guilt
and sentencing phases had deprived the defendant of due process. It
reverseds4 and remanded for a new tria1.ss
B.

The Constitutional Bases of Ake v. Oklahoma

Judicial decisions recognizing the rights of indigent defendants
have drawn their constitutional bases from several sources: the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, as
well as the right to counsel and other provisions of the sixth amendment. Due process, on which Ake was based, has until recently been a
relatively little-used doctrine in the area of indigents' rights.s 6 As Ake
demonstrates, however, it may be of increasing importance with the
Court's apparent reluctance in recent years to apply equal protection
analysis. s7
The most important cases based on due process, the "least frozen
53. 470 U.S. at 85 (footnote omitted).
54. Justice Marshall was joined in his opinion by Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, arguing in a brief
opinion that the Court's holding applied only to capital cases. 470 U.S. at 87; see Part III infra.
Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that (1) the right to psychiatric assistance should exist only
in capital cases; (2) the defendant should be entitled only "to an independent psychiatric evaluation, not to a defense consultant," 470 U.S. at 87; and (3) on the facts of the case, there had been
no showing that Ake's sanity at the time of the offense was seriously in question. 470 U.S. at 8792.
55. On remand Ake was again convicted of murder, despite the testimony of a defense psychiatrist who diagnosed him as "a paranoid schizophrenic who had been hearing voices since
1973." This time, however, the jury imposed only a sentence oflife imprisonment. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 14, 1986, at 15, col. 1 (late ed.).
The Oklahoma legislature responded to Ake by passing emergency legislation which (1) requires courts to provide a defense psychiatrist in insanity cases, and (2) grants the courts discretion to provide other kinds of defense experts - but only in capital cases. 1985 Okla. Sess. Law
Serv. 1034-35 (West); see also O'Malley v. Layden, 702 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985)
(holding funds for defense "experts" - with no apparent limitation to insanity or capital cases
- to be payable from the court fund).
56. While Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963), can be seen in part as based on due process, see Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 403-05
(1985); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974), an examination of some of their progeny,
which go beyond the minimum requirements of "fundamental fairness," makes clear that the
dominant idea of Griffin and Douglas is the "equality principle." See, e.g., Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1972); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389
U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
57. See notes 66-73 infra and accompanying text.
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concept of our law," 58 antedate the "selective incorporation" of most
of the Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth amendment and
their systematic application to the states. 59 Thus, the early right-tocounsel cases of Powell v. Alabama 60 and Betts v. Brady, 61 which today62 would be decided on the basis of the sixth amendment right to
the assistance of counsel, were based on the notion that due process
required, as a matter of "fundamental fairness," the appointment of
counsel - but only on a case-by-case basis, when special circumstances were present. Subsequent to the incorporation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel, the due process clause has been used to
establish the right to counsel in phases of the criminal justice process
where the sixth amendment does not apply, such as in probation revocation proceedings. 63
A second constitutional basis for the rights of indigent defendants
has been the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The
landmark decisions of Griffin v. lllinois 64 and Douglas v. California 65
seemed to impose on the state an "affirmative duty," going beyond the
minimum essentials of due process, to reduce, if not eliminate, the impact of poverty on a defendant's fate in the criminal justice system.
With its 1974 decision in Ross v. Moffitt, 66 however, the Court effectively emasculated equal protection as a constitutional basis for indi58. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
59. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at§§ 2.2 to 2.5.
60. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
61. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
62. Le., since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see text at notes 74-75 infra.
63. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The Court in Gagnon ~ntinued the "fundamental fairness" approach of Powell and Betts by recognizing the right to counsel only on a
case-by-case basis, where counsel was necessary due to the particular circumstances of the case.
See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at§ 11.l(b). In this respect Ake v. Oklahoma may
mark a departure in "fundamental fairness" analysis under the due process clause by laying
down a per se rule that the assistance of a psychiatrist is required in all cases where the defendant
has made the threshold showing that her sanity will be a significant factor at trial, rather than
leaving the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a psychiatrist is necessary to fundamental fairness.
While the advantage of a Powell-Betts-Gagnon case-by-case approach is allegedly its flexibility, in fact the resistance of lower courts to procedural safeguards frequently leads to a most
inflexible standard, so that the requirements for application of the safeguard are virtually never
found. In Gideon, for example, the trial court did not apply the Betts "special circumstances"
approach, but rather followed a flat rule that appointed counsel was to be supplied only in capital
cases. 372 U.S. at 337. A better approach is thereforeAke's per se rule. Compare, in the ineffective assistance of counsel cases, Judge Bazelon's advocacy of per se rules. See United States v.
Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting). See generally W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at§ 2.8(c).
For a survey of pre-Ake lower court cases on expert services decided under the due process
clause, see Decker, supra note 17, at 581-86.
64. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring that the state provide the defendant with a trial transcript
where this is necessary for the filing of an appeal).
65. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring appointed counsel on the first direct appeal as of right).
66. 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (denying a right to appointed counsel for a discretionary appeal). It
is perhaps more than a coincidence that Moffitt came only a year after the Court had held in San
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gents' rights independent of the due process clause. 67 Essentially
adopting the position which Justice Harlan had advocated in his Griffin 68 and Douglas 69 dissents, Moffitt, as Professor Kamisar points out,
"does not measure the gap between respondent and a wealthy defendant in respondent's circumstances as much as it measures respondent's opportunity to present his claim ... against some fixed standard
.... " 70 More recent cases confirm the Court's tendency to rely on due
process rather than on equal protection analysis in indigents' rights
cases.7 1 And to the extent that an equal protection approach is still
used, its reach seems to be defined by the due process requirement of
"fundamental fairness." 72 The Ake decision, by its reliance on due
process analysis to define the rights of indigent defendants, only reinforces this abandonment of equal protection doctrine. 73
A final constitutional source of the rights of indigent defendants is
the sixth amendment. Not only the right to counsel, but also the right
to compulsory process of witnesses and the confrontation clause, can
be invoked in support of the indigent defendant's right to expert assistance. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 74 the Supreme Court recognized that the
sixth amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel meant that
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), that wealth was not a "suspect
classification" for purposes of the equal protection clause.
67. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1118-19 (1978); Kamisar, supra note
22, at 1-97 to 1-110. It had been suggested as early as 1963 that the Griffin-Doug/as line of cases
turned essentially on a "fundamental fairness" analysis, barring only "discriminations based on
wealth [which] produce such great disparity in effectiveness that they are fundamentally unfair,
thus violating due process." Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1072. Such a view, which
denies "that every inequality violates due process," id., is difficult to reconcile with several subsequent cases in the Griffin-Douglas line, e.g., Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) (ordinarily, right to trial transcript for use at retrial); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (right to
transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial, without indication of need). See Kamisar, supra
note 22, at 1-93 to 1-96.
68. 351 U.S. at 34-36.
69. 372 U.S. at 361-63.
70. Kamisar, supra note 22, at 1-104 (emphasis deleted). "The duty of the State under our
cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant
... , but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims
fairly ...." Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 616. In other words, "[u]nder [Moffitt], indigent defendants ..•
are guaranteed only 'adequate,' not equal, access to the judicial system." 49 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 191, 207 (1980). For a view that Moffitt did not significantly limit the Griffin-Doug/as
doctrine, see Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court,
75 MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1334-36 & n.69 (1977).
71. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 403-05 (1985); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 66567 (1983).
72. See Kamisar, supra note 22, at 1-107 to 1-109. "The 'equality' principle once loomed as
an awesome weapon, one with almost unlimited range, but- now that Moffitt is on the books on many procedural frontiers this once treasured weapon may add nothing to what the indigent
defendant or prisoner already has in his legal arsenal." Id. at 1-109 (emphasis in original).
73. See The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, supra note 29, at 137-40. For a survey of pre-Ake
lower court cases on expert services decided on the basis of equal protection, see Decker, supra
note 17, at 586-90.
74. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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the state must appoint counsel for criminal defendants financially unable to retain their own. Gideon v. Wainwright 75 "incorporated" this
element of the sixth amendment into the fourteenth amendment, thus
making it applicable to the states. As early as Powell v. Alabama 76 the
Court recognized that the assistance of counsel must be "effective,"
and a number of state and lower federal courts have found in this right
to effective assistance of counsel the source of a constitutional requirement that indigent defendants be provided with the assistance of experts. 77 One post.,Ake case, whose facts bear a certain resemblance to
those in Ake, has been decided on the basis of the ineffective assistance
of counsel doctrine. 78
At least one state case has derived a right to expert assistance from
the sixth amendment right to the compulsory process of witnesses. 79
No case support, on the other hand, exists for a confrontation clause
right to expert assistance, but one commentator has argued that
"[e]xpert assistance and investigative preparation ... seem necessary
to preserve 'the defendant's . . . right to a fair trial as affected by his
right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him.' " 80 A
confrontation clause right to expert assistance would be particularly
helpful in identifying the expert's constitutionally required role. 81 The
requirement that the expert assist counsel in the preparation of crossexamination, the essence of any confrontation clause right, would help
to anchor the expert's role as that of a defense consultant.
75. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
76. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
77. See Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1027 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Decoster,
624 F.2d 196, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975); Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1967); Bush
v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. Tex. 1964), ajfd., 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965);
Decker, supra note 17, at 593-99; Note, Right to a Psychiatric Expert, supra note 17, at 495-96;
Note, Criminal Procedure - An Indigent's Constitutional Right to a State-Paid Expert - Williams v. Martin, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1031, 1035-37 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
State-Paid Expert].
78. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 374 (1985). In
Blake, the prosecution withheld from the examining psychiatrist a revealing taped confession and
a letter by the defendant; as a result the psychiatrist was unable effectively to examine the defendant. The similarity to Ake lies in the fact that the challenged state conduct made it impossible
for the examining psychiatrist to form an opinion about the defendant's sanity at the time of the
offense. 758 F.2d at 528; cf Ake, 470 U.S. at 72..
79. People v. Watson, 36 III. 2d 228, 221 N.E. 2d 645 (1966). The court held that the defendant in a forgery case was entitled to the expert assistance of a document examiner; funds were to
be made available not only for the expense of presenting the expert witness at trial, but also for
preliminary investigations related to the development of a defense. See Decker, supra note 17, at
590-93; Note, Right to a Psychiatric Expert, supra note 17, at 496-97; Note, State-Paid Expert,
supra note 77, at 1037-38. Watson has not been followed outside Illinois. See Decker, supra note
17, at 591-93, and cases cited therein.
80. Note, Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense, supra note 17, at 643 (quoting United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (emphasis added by cited Note)).
81. See Part IV infra.
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EXPERTS OTHER THAN PSYCHIATRISTS

The Ake opinion dealt exclusively with the indigent's right to a
psychiatrist for the presentation of an insanity defense. 82 The Court
did not address the question of whether the right to expert assistance
might extend to other kinds of experts. Analysis of the opinion and of
the constitutional doctrines on which it rests shows, however, that
Ake's logic extends to the provision of other kinds of expert assistance
in appropriate cases. 8 3
Because of Ake's failure to address the question of other experts, as
well as its emphasis on the importance of psychiatry in criminal law
today, 84 an argument might be made for limiting Ake to its facts, i.e.,
to the right to a psychiatrist for an insanity defense. The opinion is
grounded, however, in very broad concepts of constitutional requirements, which indicate that it should have more general application.
The Court declared that "when a State brings its judicial power to
bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take
steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his
defense." 85 Citing the fourteenth amendment's "due process guarantee of fundamental fairness," 86 the Court discussed its precedents in
the area of indigent defendants' rights, 87 concluding that the state
must provide the indigent defendant with "access to the raw materials
integral to the building of an effective defense." 88
The Court's conclusion that a psychiatrist is, in appropriate cases,
one of these essential "raw materials" was based on its use of the
three-prong test of Mathews v. Eldridge. 89 There is no reason to believe that the Mathews test would turn out any differently for a
pathologist or a handwriting expert than it did for a psychiatrist in
Ake. 90 The "private interest" - the defendant's interest in her life or
liberty - is equally compelling, regardless of the nature of her defense
or the type of expert required. The state's interest, largely an economic one, is hardly more heavily burdened by the requirement that it
provide access to one competent ballistics expert or arson investigator,
for example, than to the "one competent psychiatrist" required by
82. As the Georgia Supreme Court pointed out in Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 448-49, 330
S.E.2d 563, 566 (1985), Ake specifically required a psychiatrist in cases of an insanity defense;
thus, "the guidelines of Ake would not be satisfied by providing the defense with access to an
examination by a mental health expert other than a psychiatrist."
83. On the meaning of "appropriate cases," see Part V infra.
84. 470 U.S. at 79-83, 85.
85. 470 U.S. at 76.
86. 470 U.S. at 76.
87. 470 U.S. at 76.
88. 470 U.S. at 77.
89. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
90. See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text.
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Ake. 91 The experience of the federal government under the Criminal
Justice Act,92 and of various states that provide expert services, has
shown that the costs involved are reasonable. 93 The "third prong,"
"the probable value of the [expert] assistance sought, and the risk of
error in the proceeding if such assistance is not o:ffered," 94 yields a
similar result. It is difficult to imagine how, when a conviction may
turn on an issue of fact that may be established or refuted by expert
assistance, the value of such assistance and the risk of error from its
denial could be less than in the case of a psychiatrist. 95
As noted by Ake's counsel, the states have "recognized the necessity of expert services in the most meaningful manner - by providing
for State payment of experts' fees when the experts are hired by the
prosecution. " 96 Widespread prosecutorial use of many kinds of nonpsychiatric97 experts not only illustrates the importance of expert services but is also one reason why the defense is so seriously
91. 470 U.S. at 79.
92. See text at notes 13-15 supra.
93. In response to Oklahoma's argument in Ake that the cost of providing indigent defendants with psychiatrists would be "staggering," Brief of Respondent at 47, counsel for Ake
presented figures showing very modest annual costs for all expert services incurred by the federal
government ($832,305 in Fiscal Year 1983) and a sample of states (e.g., $53,995 in Kansas;
$230,943 in Colorado; $428,252 in New Jersey; $1,209,183 in New York; $18,292 in Vermont).
Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 13. In light of these modest costs, it is difficult to argue seriously
that the state's fiscal interest should weigh heavily in the Mathews balance. Even if the cost of
providing expert services were greater, it is at least open to question whether this factor should
weigh heavily against the individual's interest in her life or liberty. See note 41 supra.
A different kind of cost issue is whether, in an individual case, the expected cost of the requested expert services should affect their provision. This would be an issue particularly where
the expense is unusually high. The best answer is probably that unusual expenses might legitimately require a somewhat higher showing of necessity for expert services. Cf. United States v.
Mundt, 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975) (refusal of authorization
for an investigator to go to Peru in connection with the defendant's arrest there for conspiracy to
import cocaine did not violate the federal Criminal Justice Act, absent a strong showing as to
necessity).
94. 470 U.S. at 79.
95. For an argument to the contrary, see Note, supra note 35, at 149-51.
96. Brief for the Petitioner at 28, Ake (emphasis in original).
97. Even in regard to psychiatrists, theAke opinion dealt only with access to a psychiatrist
for presentation of an insanity defense or on the issue of future dangerousness in capital sentencing proceedings. It did not explicitly address the right to a psychiatrist on other issues, such as
determination of competency to stand trial or establishment of mitigating factors in sentencing.
There has been some post-Ake litigation on such questions. For example, in Kordenbrock v.
Commonwealth, 700 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Ky. 1985), it was held that Ake did not grant a capital
defendant a "psychiatric fishing expedition" in a search for mitigating factors in sentencing; see
also Brewer v. State, 718 P.2d 354, 363-64 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). Whatever the merits of
these particular cases, it is hard to believe that Ake, together with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (sentencer must be permitted to consider all aspects of defendant's character as mitigating
factors), would not guarantee a defendant the right to such psychiatric assistance as could help
him to establish mitigating circumstances.
Two courts have dealt with requests for mental health experts on the issue of the defendant's
competency to waive his Miranda rights. Compare In re Allen R., - N.H. - , 506 A.2d 329
(1986) (expert granted), with State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 342 S.E.2d 811, 816 (1986) (expert
denied).
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handicapped without them. It is illusory to expect that an unassisted
defense counsel could adequately represent his client when confronted
with complex scientific evidence:
When counsel is shown a pathology report, a post-mortem photograph
and a drawer full of autopsy specimens and slides, unless he himself is
trained in pathology, he will be unlikely to spot possible errors of interpretation or description, the omission of relevant data and procedures, or
indeed, the very significance - both medical and forensic - of what he
is shown. Similar problems confront counsel in cases involving plant
identification, handwriting, blood typology, identification of drugs or
fingerprints. 98

Given the importance of nonpsychiatric experts99 to accurate factfinding, Ake's reasoning requires that they be made available to the
indigent defendant as well as the prosecution. 100
The right to expert assistance is also implicit in other opinions of
the Court, such as Gilbert v. California. 101 In Gilbert, the Court held
that the ability of the defense to present its own expert witnesses and
to cross-examine prosecution experts at trial made it unnecessary for
defense counsel to be present during "non-critical" stages of proceedings such as the taking of handwriting samples. 102 Thus, a defendant
who because of indigency was unable to present an expert witness or
effectively cross-examine prosecution experts would also be denied the
98. Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 663.
99. Even experts who would not be allowed to testify in court should be provided where they
"reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel in their preparation." United States v. Pope,
251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Neb. 1966) (interpreting the federal Criminal Justice Act) (emphasis in
original). For example, polygraph tests may often be helpful even where not admissible, as in
cases where the district attorney may be willing to drop prosecution if the defendant "passes" a
polygraph test. See Oaks, supra note 15, at § 7.14[2]. The most frequently used type of nontestifying expert is the general investigator. See note 103 infra.
100. The American Bar Association's STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE§ 5-1.4 (2d ed.
1980) calls for provision of "investigatory, expert, and other services necessary to an adequate
defense," without any limitation to specific types of experts such as psychiatrists. The commentary to this standard puts psychiatrists and other experts on the same plane in noting that "[t]he
quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and yet valueless to the defendant if the
defense requires the assistance of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no such services are
available." Id.
Similarly, the federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982), provides
for "investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense." During the first
two years after the Act's passage, the most frequently used services were investigators, psychiatrists, interpreters, handwriting experts, and fact witnesses. In addition, the following services
were provided: bacteriologist, chemist, coin expert, certified public accountant, electroencephalographic test, fingerprint expert, gun expert, jewelry appraiser, key punch operator, electronic
data processing machine operator, neurologist, neuropsychiatrist, neurosurgeon, opthalmologist,
optometrist, pathologist, pharmacologist, physician, psychologist, psychoanalyst, probation officer, sound expert statistician, surveyor, used clothing expert. Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.14[1].
101. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
102. 388 U.S. at 267; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967), where in
dicta the Court made the same comment concerning the lack of necessity of the presence of
counsel during the analysis of the defendant's "fingerprints, blood samples, clothing, hair, and
the like."
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Court-prescribed means of protecting her interests during these "noncritical" stages.
Since theAke decision, its author has hinted strongly thatAke may
require the appointment of investigators 103 for indigent defendants.
Dissenting in United States v. Bagley, 104 Justice Marshall noted that
"the Court has not ... expressly required that the State provide to the
defendant ... investigators who will assure that the defendant has an
opportunity to discover every existing piece of helpful evidence. But
cf. Ake v. Oklahoma .... "105
In the lower courts, a number of pre-Ake decisions involving investigators, 106 pathologists, 107 and handwriting experts 108 had found a
constitutional duty to provide expert assistance. Few post-Ake cases
have yet arisen where the courts have directly addressed the question
of Ake's applicability to other experts. Exceptional - and almost certainly wrong - is Ex parte Grayson, 109 where the Alabama Supreme
Court rejected the petitioner's "novel contention" that under Ake he
was entitled to a forensic pathologist: "[T]here is nothing contained in
the Ake decision to suggest that the United States Supreme Court was
addressing anything other than psychiatrists and the insanity defense." 110 Generally, where defendants have attempted to use theAke
103. Investigators are among the most frequently needed types of defense experts. In recognition of this the federal Criminal Justice Act provides explicitly for "investigative" services. 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982). Despite some reluctance on the part of the federal courts to grant
defense investigators, Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.14[3]; Decker, supra note 17, at 605-07, investigators were the most frequently used category of experts during the first two years the Criminal
Justice Act was in effect. Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.14[1]. The Ninth Circuit has held that the
provision of investigative services is required by due process when necessary to the preparation of
an effective defense. Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 936 (1975) (holding, however, that the showing of need had not been made). See also 13
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 655 (1977).
An additional reason for the provision of investigators is that an attorney doing her own
investigation could be placed in an untenable position if a witness she interviewed changed his
story in court. The attorney would then be faced with the difficult prospect of taking the stand to
impeach the witness. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 661 n.48; Comment, Assistance
in Addition to Counsel, supra note 17, at 327 n.31; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983) (incompatibility of roles of witness and advocate).
104. 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985). Bagley dealt with prosecutorial failure to disclose information
favorable to the defense.
105. 105 S. Ct. at 3390 (emphasis added). In its only other post-Ake case where the issue has
arisen, the Court declined to consider the defendant's argument that he should have been granted
an investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert, on the ground that he had failed to
make a sufficient showing of need for them. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 n. l
(1985). On the showing required for access to an expert, see Part V infra.
106. E.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane); Mason v.
Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975).
107. E.g., Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980).
108. E.g., People v. Watson, 36 III. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
109. 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 189 (1985).
110. 479 So. 2d at 82. Even in this case the issues were mixed in such a way that the question
may not have been squarely presented. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in passing on
the case well before theAke decision, had in fact recognized a constitutional right to nonpsychia-
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precedent to obtain the assistance of nonpsychiatric experts, the courts
have rejected the requests on the basis of insufficient showing of need
for the expert. 111 Thus, while Ake's reasoning strongly suggests that
the constitutional right to expert assistance is not limited to psychiatrists for an insanity defense, 112 this remains to be established when an
appropriate case arises.

III.

EXPERTS IN NONCAPITAL CASES

A second question concerns the offenses to which the requirement
for provision of expert assistance should apply. The initial issue is
whether Ake applies only to capital cases. If it is not so limited, as this
Note argues, a further question is the extent to which it extends to
relatively minor offenses. This Note suggests that the right to expert
assistance should exist in all cases where there is a right to counsel.
tric expert assistance in appropriate cases. It held, however, that Grayson had not established a
need for the requested services. Grayson v. State, 479 So. 2d 69, 71-73 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
Grayson had been granted the statutory limit of $500 for expert services, which was spent on a
public opinion survey in support of a motion for change in venue. The Alabama Supreme Court
rejected his contention that the $500 limit violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. 479
So. 2d at 78-79.
In another case dealing explicitly with Ake's applicability to nonpsychiatric experts, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the defendant's contention that he should have
been provided with an expert in bloodstain analysis. Distinguishing Ake, the court argued that
- in contrast to sanity issues - the
risk [of inaccurate resolution] in other areas of scientific evidence is not necessarily present
because the scientific expert is often able to explain to the jury how a conclusion was
reached, the defense counsel can attack that conclusion, and the jury can then decide
whether the conclusion had a sound basis.
Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 839 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). The court's apparent assumptions
- that expert opinion in scientific fields other than psychiatry is less controversial, and that an
unassisted defense counsel is competent to challenge such experts - are at least questionable.
See text accompanying note 98 supra; notes 163-70 infra and accompanying text. Denial of a
defense expert would seem to have been particularly inappropriate in this case, moreover, since
the court was required to decide as a question of first impression whether the serological electrophoresis method of bloodstain analysis was sufficiently reliable to be admissible. See 719 P.2d at
839-40. The Michigan Supreme Court - with the benefit of expert opinion on both sides of the
issue - has subsequently held electrophoresis evidence inadmissible. People v. Young, 425
Mich. 470, 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986).
111. See, e.g., Hold v. State, 485 So. 2d 801, 802-03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (investigator);
Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 340 S.E.2d 891, 904-05 (1986) (investigator and "interrogation
expert"); Commonwealth v. Thacker, No. 85-CA-34-MR, slip op. (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1985)
(serologist); State v. Artis, 316 N.C. 507, 342 S.E.2d 847, 850-51 (1986) (jury selection expert);
State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 342 S.E.2d 811, 814-16 (1986) (investigator, statistician, social
psychologist); State v. Allen, 77 N.C. App. 142, 334 S.E.2d 410, 412-13 (1985) (investigator);
• Standridge v. State, 701 P.2d 761, 764 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (bitemark expert); State v. Berry,
76 Or. App. l, 707 P.2d 638, 640 (1985) (anthropologist); State v. Evans, No. 84-199, slip op.
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 1985) (ballistics expert). In other cases, courts have rejected expert
requests based on Ake on the ground that the proposed testimony would be inadmissible. See
State v. Campbell, 127 N.H. 112, 498 A.2d 330 (1985) (child psychologist to evaluate the credibility of a child witness); State v. Teeters, No. C-840397, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1985)
(expert on rape trauma syndrome). But cf. note 99 supra.
112. See notes 82-100 supra and accompanying text.
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Capital and Noncapital Cases

The issue of whether Ake's holding applied only to capital offenses
separated the Ake majority from the concurring and dissenting opinions.113 While the majority did not explicitly address this question,
nothing suggests that it intended to limit its holding to capital cases.
To the contrary, the opinion speaks in broad terms of the recognition
of the constitutional rights of indigent defendants, and it refers to the
individual's compelling interest where her "life or liberty" is at
stake. 114 Apart from the actual facts of the case, it is difficult to find
anything in the opinion that would justify limiting its scope to capital
cases. Moreover, where the constitutional violation requiring reversal
occurs during the guilt rather than the sentencing phase of a trial, 115
and where, as here, the Court reverses the conviction rather than
merely vacating the death sentence, "there is no logical basis for distinguishing between capital and non-capital defendants." 116
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Burger's brief opinion concurring in the
judgment asserted that "[n]othing in the Court's opinion reaches noncapital cases." 117 Arguing that the "finality" of the sentence warranted additional protection in capital cases, the Chief Justice wished
to leave open the question of whether the assistance of a psychiatrist
would be required in other cases. 118 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist
urged that any right to psychiatric assistance be limited to capital
cases. Unlike the Chief Justice, however, Rehnquist was well aware
that the Court's opinion contained no such limitation. 11 9
113. As long as the issue is exclusively whether a psychiatrist, as opposed to other kinds of
experts, is required, the question of whether Ake should extend to noncapital cases may rarely
arise. Because a plea of insanity is "tantamount to an admission" of commission of the act, and
because a successful insanity defense usually results in indeterminate confinement, "[i]nsanity
pleas are almost exclusively raised in cases of homicide or other capital offenses." Gardner, The
Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert, 2 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 99, 104 (1976). Thus, the
real significance of applying Ake to noncapital offenses is seen only when it is also applied to
experts other than psychiatrists. See Part II supra.
114. 470 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). The brief on behalf of Ake in the Supreme Court
seems consciously to avoid placing any emphasis on the fact that this was a capital case (except
in its section concerning the sentencing proceedings). Brief for the Petitioner at 18-37. Apparently the American Civil Liberties Union, which represented Ake in the Supreme Court, wished
to establish a more broadly applicable precedent.
115. In Ake, of course, the defendant's rights were violated during both the guilt phase, 470
U.S. at 78-83, and the sentencing phase, 470 U.S. at 83-84.
116. Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J.
1545, 1550 n.14 (1985).
117. 470 U.S. at 87. At least two courts have indicated uncertainty, in view of the Chief
Justice's opinion, as to whether Ake applied to noncapital cases. See Williams v. Newsome, 254
Ga. 714, 715, 334 S.E.2d 171, 172 (1985); Satterwhite v. State, 697 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985); see also State v. Evans, No. 84-199, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 1985)
(distinguishing Ake as a capital case). And one court has held flatly "that Ake does not reach
noncapital cases." Isom v. State, 488 So. 2d 12, 13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
118. 470 U.S. at 87.
119. 470 U.S. at 87.
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An examination of the Court's entire line of indigents' rights cases,
of which Ake v. Oklahoma is the latest, also demonstrates that a distinction between capital and noncapital offenses has no place here. Of
the eight cases cited in Ake 120 to illustrate the Court's "long
recogni[tion] that when a State brings its judicial power to bear on an
indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense," 121 only one was a capital case. 122 Important noncapital cases
recognizing the rights of indigent defendants have been based on the
sixth amendment right to counsel, 123 the fourteenth amendment equal
protection guarantee, 124 and the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. 125
The same considerations apply here as in the earlier debate on
whether the right to counsel should extend to noncapital crimes. One
commentator argued then that "the crucial inquiry would seem to be,
not so much the penalties imposed on the defendant upon conviction,
but the need for skilled representation in the proceedings," concluding
that there was little reason to believe that this need was greater in
capital than noncapital cases. 126 Or, as Justice Clark noted in his concurring opinion in Gideon, "The Fourteenth Amendment requires due
process of law for the deprival of 'liberty' just as for deprival of 'life,'
and there cannot constitutionally be a difference in the quality of the
process based merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction involved."127 In light of these precedents it is difficult to see how a right,
determined by the Court to be essential to the due process guarantee of
a fair trial, could be limited to capital cases.1 2s
120. See 470 U.S. at 76.
121. 470 U.S. at 76.
122. Only Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), involved imposition of the death
penalty. For the other, noncapital, cases cited by the Court, see note 39 supra.
123. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial).
124. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to appointed counsel on first direct
appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to a trial transcript for appeal).
125. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (right to appointed counsel under certain circumstances in parole and probation revocation proceedings). Even under the pre-Gideo11 right·
to-counsel test of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), where the appointment of counsel was
required only when "special circumstances" were present, imposition of capital punishment was
only one of several possible circumstances in which due process required the appointment of
counsel. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at§ 11.l(a).
126. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, a11d State Systems of Crimi11a/ Justice, 8
DEPAUL L. REv. 213, 230-31 (1959) (emphasis in original); see also Kamisar, Betts v. Brady
Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219, 25460 (1962).
127. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring). But cf. Comment, The Constitutional Right to Assistance i11 Addition to Counsel i11 a Death Pe11alty Case, 23
DuQ. L. REV. 753 (1985) (assuming that capital cases are qualitatively different).
128. It is also worth observing that the federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e) (1982), which provides for the appointment of experts, contains no limitation to capital cases. In United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1985), the court applied Ake to a
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Ake's Lower Limit

There remains the question of the "lower limit" of the constitutional right to an expert. Because the right to counsel may be ineffective where necessary expert assistance is denied, 129 an indigent
defendant should be granted the assistance of necessary experts in all
cases where he has the constitutional right to counsel. 130 In
Argersinger v. Hamlin 131 the Court extended this right to misdemeanor cases where actual imprisonment is imposed; in Scott v. Illinois 132 it refused to go beyond this to an "authorized imprisonment"
standard which would require the appointment of counsel for offenses
for which imprisonment could be imposed. 133 As long as the line
drawn by Argersinger and Scott defines the indigent defendant's right
to counsel, it should also mark the lower limit of his right to expert
assistance. 134
IV.

ROLE OF THE EXPERT

One of the most difficult questions in the area of expert assistance
noncapital case to reverse the trial court's determination that no defense psychiatrist was required under section 3006A.
129. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text. Even if it could be argued that the Mathews due process balancing test might yield a different result where "only brief incarceration"
was involved, see The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, supra note 29, at 136 n.34, the indigent's right
to an expert would still find support in the sixth amendment.
130. The federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982), follows this approach. Subsection (a)(4) provides that the Act, which requires the appointment of both counsel
and expert services, applies to any person "for whom the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
requires the appointment of counsel." The federal scheme for the appointment of counsel and
expert assistance goes beyond the constitutional requirement, however, notably by mandating the
appointment of counsel and experts in the case of any offense for which a sentence of over six
months' imprisonment could be imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(l) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1(3)
(defining "petty offense"); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 §§ 212, 223(e), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3559,
3006A(a)(l), (b) (1985), as amended by Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-217, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985) (replacing the concept of"petty offense," effective November 1,
1987, by "Class B" misdemeanors or less).
131. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
132. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
133. Scott has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois and
the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71 (1979);
Elson, supra note 41, at 183-86. As it is difficult to argue that the right to expert assistance is
more fundamental than the right to counsel, it is not contended here that the reach of Ake should
extend beyond the right to appointed counsel, currently defined by Scott. But cf note 134 infra.
134. Ake may also provide some basis for the application of a right to expert assistance in
"quasi-criminal" civil proceedings. The Court noted that it had extended the rights of indigents
"to a 'quasi-criminal' proceeding" in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), where in a paternity
action the state was required to provide blood grouping tests for the putative father. Ake, 470
U.S. at 76. Streater was thus a recognition of a right under certain circumstances to expert
assistance in a "quasi-criminal" case, well before Ake established this right in criminal cases as
such. Arguably, the Streater and Ake decisions could lead to a more general right to expert
assistance in certain kinds of civil proceedings, for example civil commitment hearings. But see
In re Williams, 133 Ill. App. 3d 232, 478 N.E.2d 867, 869-70 (1985) (holding, in a civil commitment hearing, that the right recognized in Ake "has not been extended to civil cases").
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is the definition of the expert's proper role. One model is that of the
"neutral" expert, who makes her services and findings available to defense and prosecution alike. Alternatively, one can imagine a "partisan" expert or "defense consultant," 135 who exclusively assists the
defense in the same manner as would a retained expert. This Note
argues that, in all respects except the defendant's free choice of his
expert, a "partisan" expert is constitutionally required.136
A starting point for analysis is the Ake opinion itself. Justice Marshall's crucial language provides that once the necessary showing is
made, 137 "the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access
to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. " 138 The expert's proper role is, in other words, that of a
consultant for the defense. The Court's clear statement is, however,
somewhat qualified by what follows: "This is not to say, of course,
that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own."
Rather, "as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the
States the decision on how to implement this right." 139 This qualification introduces sufficient ambiguity and "flexibility" to ensure considerable future litigation.140
An examination of the Ake Court's handling of its 1953 precedent,
United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 141 makes clear its position regarding the expert's role. The Court first distinguished Baldi, where "neutral psychiatrists" had in fact examined the defendant and testified at
his trial. 142 Baldi thus did not address the Ake situation, where the
defendant had been denied any psychiatric assistance concerning his
sanity at the time of the offense; at most, the Court said, it stood for
the proposition that an indigent defendant had a right only to the
135. The term "defense consultant" is from Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Ake,
470 U.S. at 87.
136. The inquiry here is into the minimum treatment which a state must provide in order to
satisfy the constitutional requirement. A state could, of course, exceed the minimum standard
(for example by permitting the defendant to choose his own expert), but it could not constitution·
ally deviate in the direction of a "neutral" expert.
137. See Part V infra.
138. 470 U.S. at 83 (emphasis added). At another point, Marshall states the tasks of the
psychiatrist as follows: "to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense,
to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in
preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses." 470 U.S. at 82.
139. 470 U.S. at 83.
•
140. Indeed, one post-Ake writer has predicted that this issue will be the subject of the next
constitutional battles. Sallet, supra note 116, at 1551 n.18.
141. 344 U.S. 561 (1953); see note 19 supra. Until Ake, most courts which rejected the con·
stitutional right to expert assistance relied on Baldi.
142. Ake, 470 U.S. at 84-85. The same was true, the Court noted, in McGarty v. O'Brien,
188 F.2d 151, 155 (1st Cir. 1951), on which the Baldi Court had relied. 470 U.S. at 85.
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"neutral" assistance which the defendant in Baldi had received. 143
The assistance of a "neutral" expert is thus the Baldi standard. This
standard the Court proceeded to reject, declaring that "our disagreement with the State's reliance on [Baldi] is more fundamental. That
case was decided at a time when indigent defendants in state courts
had no constitutional right to even the presence of counsel." Since
then, the Court had recognized the elementary rights of indigent defendants and thus signaled its "commitment to assuring meaningful
access to the judicial process." Thus, "we are not limited by [Baldi] in
considering whether fundamental fairness today requires a different
result." 144
It is clear therefore from the Ake opinion that while the indigent
defendant does not have the constitutional right to choose his own
expert, and while the states are left some flexibility in implementation
of arrangements for expert services, the expert is not to be "neutral";
rather, she is to assist the defense. Her role is to include the functions
of investigation, evaluation of strategies, preparation and presentation
of testimony, and preparation of cross-examination of prosecution
experts. 145
In spite of this relatively clear language in Ake, the issue appears
not to be fully settled in practice. A number of post-Ake cases in the
lower courts have accepted arrangements where only "neutral" experts - or less - were provided. 146 It is thus important to under143. 470 U.S. at 85.
144. 470 U.S. at 85.
145. By establishing the indigent defendant's right to a defense expert, Ake seems to have
expanded the rights of nonindigents as well. This is apparent in Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228
Va. 493, 323 S.E.2d 539 (1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2315, affd. on remand, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d
838 (1985). Following a court-ordered sanity evaluation at a state hospital, the court denied
defendant's request for a second examination at his own expense. 323 S.E.2d at 544. The
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded "in light of Ake v. Oklahoma." 105 S. Ct.
2315. On remand the Virginia Supreme Court held that Tuggle's rights had been violated by
denial of a defense psychiatrist in the sentencing phase of trial; in regard to the guilt phase it held
that the defendant had not made the requisite showing that sanity was to be a siguificant factor in
his defense, but it made no reference to defendant's nonindigent status. 334 S.E.2d at 841-44.
Thus, the actions of both the United States and Virginia Supreme Courts indicate that they see
the Ake right to a defense psychiatrist as extending to nonindigent defendants. Similarly, Ake's
emphasis on the right to an independent defense expert should result in reexamination of rules
which limit independent analysis of physical evidence to evidence which is "critical" (i.e., the
only evidence linking the defendant to the crime) and subject to varying expert opinions. See
Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1979); Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.
1975); Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 189 (1985).
146. See, e.g., Glass v. Blackbum, 791 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussed at note
150 infra and accompanying text); Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1986)
(discussed at note 175 infra); Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 481-82 (Ind. 1985) (discussed at
note 151 infra and accompanying text); Commonwealth v. Thacker, No. 85-CA-34-MR, slip op.
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1985) (discussed at note 152 infra and accompanying text); State v.
lndvik, 382 N.W.2d 623, 625-26 (N.D. 1986) (discussed at note 150 infra and accompanying
text); Satterwhite v. State, 697 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (discussed in text at note
150 infra); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838, 840-41 (1985) (discussed in
text at note 150 infra). But see, e.g., Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 449, 330 S.E.2d 563, 567
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stand why a "partisan" expert is essential to due process. 147
There are several reasons why an "impartial" or "neutral" expert
is not an adequate safeguard of the defendant's constitutional rights. 148
The problem is particularly severe, first of all, under a scheme where
the "neutral" expert's findings are available to both the defense and
the prosecution. It is difficult, in such a situation, to imagine a defense
attorney, unless his case was already a very weak one, requesting the
appointment of such an expert without being certain of a favorable
result. Otherwise, he would risk creating evidence against his client
and "convicting [his] own client with [his] diligence and zeal."1 49 Several post-Ake cases have, to be sure, condoned procedures under
which the expert reported his findings to the court150 or to the prose(1985) ("[I]n addition to examining the defendant, the psychiatrist must assist the defense by
aiding defense counsel in the cross-examination and rebuttal of the state's medical experts.").
147. In addition, the analysis presented below is important for purposes of dealing with
problems which are likely to arise from the Court's willingness to leave implementation to the
states. See notes 183-89 infra and accompanying text.
148. For an argument to the contrary, see Note, Right to a Psychiatric Expert, supra note 17,
at 499-504.
149. Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 666. Even where the test results are not disclosed, the mere knowledge that an examination took place may be prejudicial. See, e.g., Hill v.
State, 432 So. 2d 427, 437 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), where the court cited as
evidence of the defendant's competence his failure to offer the testimony of a psychologist who
had examined him prior to trial.
At least one court has suggested that procedures where the "neutral" expert makes his findings available to ,the prosecution and the defense might raise constitutional problems of self·
incrimination. United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158, 166 (E.D. Wis. 1955) (questioning
constitutionality of former FED. R. CRIM. P. 28, predecessor of FED. R. Evm. 706(a), which
required court-appointed expert to disclose findings to both parties), revd. on other grounds, 241
F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957); see also Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.16[3]. In Smith v. Murray, 106 S.
Ct. 2661 (1986), the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to rule on the admissibility of damaging testimony by a psychiatrist appointed by the court to examine the defendant at the latter's
request, deciding the case instead on procedural grounds. Four Justices, however, were willing
to reach the merits and would have held that, at a minimum, admitting the examining psychiatrist's testimony would violate the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, unless the psychiatrist gave Miranda warnings prior to the examination. 106 S. Ct. at 267576 & n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters found it unnecessary to consider the argument
that where the psychiatric examination was ordered to assist the defense the due process concerns of Ake required "an absolute guarantee of confidentiality," rather than merely the giving of
Miranda warnings. 106 S. Ct. at 2676 n.23.
The reports of a defense expert are generally discoverable by the prosecution only when the
defense intends to introduce the reports or the expert's testimony at trial. Otherwise discovery
would be barred by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the sixth amend·
ment right to effective assistance of counsel. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 41, at
§ 19.4(i). The concerns here are similar to those which have led most states to apply the
attorney-client privilege to the work of defense experts. See, e.g., State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516,
520, 398 A.2d 421, 423 (1979) ("[I]t is now almost universally accepted in this country that the
scope of the attorney-client privilege, at least in criminal causes, embraces those agents whose
services are required by the attorney in order that he may properly prepare his client's case.").
But cf Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists. 66 VA. L. REV. 597,
635-42 (1980) (urging that the attorney-client privilege not be used to exclude psychiatric testimony when the defendant's mental state is at issue).
150. Glass v. Blackburn, 791 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1986) (two-doctor "sanity commission" reporting to the court); State v. lndvik, 382 N.W.2d 623, 625-26 (N.D. 1986) (state
hospital staff psychiatrists, who ultimately testified for the prosecution); Satterwhite v. State, 697
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cution for transmittal to the defense, 151 or where the defense was simply given access to the findings of the state's experts. 152 A better
reading of Ake, however, is that of the Tenth Circuit, which emphasized in United States v. Sloan 153 that the Court's duty to appoint a
defense expert "cannot be satisfied with the appointment of an expert
who ultimately testifies contrary to the defense . . . . The essential
benefit of having an expert in the first place is denied the defendant
when the services of the doctor must be shared with the
prosecution." 154
More fundamentally, the use of an "impartial" expert subverts the
adversary system by shifting the decision from the jury (or judge) to
the expert. Expert opinion is, in fact, often unreliable, 155 and use of an
"impartial" expert gives a false illusion of certainty; a "battle of the
experts" in the context of the adversary system, on the other hand,
permits the jury to evaluate scientific opinions. Thus, due process may
be denied where the indigent defendant is not granted the resources to
participate independently in this "battle of the experts." 156
S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838,
840-41 (1985).
151. Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 481-82 (Ind. 1985). The court did hold that in order
to comply with Ake the psychiatrist would have to be "available for consultation with [defense]
counsel"; it added, however, that such consultations could not take place before the psychiatrist
examined the defendant. 486 N.E.2d at 482. The court's model is still that of a "neutral" expert,
with some concession to the defense counsel's need to prepare for trial. It is doubtful, to say the
least, that such an arrangement satisfies the requirements of Ake. The most obvious objection is
that the defense counsel must surely be permitted to form an opinion about the viability of an
insanity defense (to use this example) without creating evidence which can be used against his
client.
152. Commonwealth v. Thacker, No. 85-CA-34-MR, slip op. (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1985)
("[A]ppellee herein was not denied the results and reports of the serologist who did testify, and
should have had some idea of the nature of his testimony prior to trial."). The court disposed of
Ake by asserting that the Supreme Court's mention in a footnote of relevant Kentucky statutes
meant "that Kentucky ... provides the necessary assistance." Cf. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78 n.4 (listing
statutes and judicial decisions in 41 states which provide psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants).
If defense access to findings of the prosecution experts is deemed adequate, why not the
reverse? Simply to mention the possibility that the prosecution could be precluded from utilizing
government funds for its own expert because a defense expert's report was available should suffice to demonstrate the incompatibility with an adversary proceeding of such one-sided arrangements. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 658.
153. 776 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1985).
154. 776 F.2d at 929. An example of a state's recognition of the partisan nature of the defense expert and the confidential nature of her relationship with defense counsel is to be found in
Florida's Rules of Criminal Procedure. These provide that in appropriate cases where insanity
or incompetence is at issue, the court "shall appoint one expert to examine the defendant in order
to assist his attorney in the preparation of his defense. Such expert shall report only to the
attorney for the defendant and matters related to the expert shall be deemed to fall under the
lawyer-client privilege." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216(a).
155. See notes 162-70 infra and accompanying text.
156. The question raised here has potentially broader significance than the application to
indigent defendants. Although rarely used, FED. R. Evm. 706 permits the court to appoint its
own independent expert, who "shall advise the parties of his findings." For a discussion of some
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It is important to note that the question is not whether an impartial expert could provide due process in any setting, but rather
whether such an arrangement provides due process for the indigent
defendant in the American criminal justice system based on adversary
proceedings. What may be fair in some nonadversarial settings may
be a denial of justice in the context of the adversary system. 157 As the
Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he very premise of our adversary system
of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and
the innocent go free." 158 And if the criminal justice process "loses its
character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional
guarantee [of the effective assistance of counsel] is violated." 159
Considerable empirical evidence on the use of court-appointed
"impartial" experts, and particularly psychiatrists, has shown that the
trier of fact, whether judge or jury, almost invariably accepts the expert's opinion. 160 Thus, the decisionmaking function shifts from the
jury or judge to the expert, undermining the adversary system. 16 1
of the problems involved in judges calling their own expert witnesses, see Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 74-80 (1978).
157. Cf Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (For "incorporation" of specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, the question is not whether the
provision constitutes "fundamental fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined but
[whether it] is fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the American
States.").
158. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
159. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984).
160. An examination of the use of court-appointed experts, based on research in Sweden and
on various American studies, concluded that "the presentation of psychiatric opinions to a judge
or jury by court-appointed psychiatrists designated 'impartial,' rather than by psychiatrists called
by and identified with the state or defense as adversaries, shifts the decision-making power from
the judge or jury to the testifying psychiatrists." Reisner & Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity
Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish
Experience, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 770 (1974). In the Swedish study, the courts followed the
psychiatrists' recommendations in 99% of the cases. Id. Similarly, a study of the results of jury
trials in states providing for court appointment of a state mental institution showed that, over
periods of 23 and 30 years, juries rejected the hospitals' conclusions in only five of 1000 cases in
Ohio, and only once in 500 cases in Maine. Guttmacher & Weihofen, The Psychiatrist on the
Witness Stand, 32 B.U. L. REv. 287, 313-14 (1952). A former practicing psychiatrist at St.
Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Columbia noted from his experience that "[i]n the overwhelming majority of cases the hospital's report to the court is the sole determinant of the outcome of the insanity defense." Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing
Psychiatrist Views Durham and Brawner, 1913 WASH. U. L.Q. 87, 89. The trial becomes merely
"a nonadversary process of rubber stamping the conclusions of psychiatrists regarding the defendant's responsibility." Gardner, supra note 113, at 106. See also A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note
35, at 131-36; Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense,
110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061, 1067-76 (1962).
161. The undermining of the adversary system may also have broader consequences for the
system of justice and the community within which it exists. As noted by the Attorney General's
Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, the adversary system
evolved out of "a system of justice that provide[d] inadequate opportunities to challenge official
decisions • . . . As such, it makes essential and invaluable contributions to the maintenance of the
free society." Thus, "the conditions produced by the financial incapacity of the accused are
detrimental to the proper functioning of the system of justice and •.• the loss in vitality of the
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Moreover, the appearance of certainty presented by the testimony of a
court-appointed "impartial" expert is often an illusion. While particularly clear in the case of psychiatric testimony, 162 evidence of the unreliability or misuse of expert opinions exists in fields such as laboratory
testing, 163 handwriting, 164 pathology, 165 fingerprinting, 166 arson invesadversary system, thereby occasioned, significantly endangers the basic interests of a free community." POVERTY AND THE ADMINISfRATION OF JusncE, supra note 3, at 10-11.
162. Reisner and Semmel note that the argument for "impartial" psychiatric experts rests on
three premises: "first, that the diagnostic and predictive process is scientific, that is, having some
unified theoretical framework capable of producing an acceptable level of reliability; second, that
a state-operated psychiatric service is 'impartial;' third, that the issue to be determined is purely a
scientific one." Reisner & Semmel, supra note 160, at 772 (footnotes omitted). In fact, they find
that "[f]ew scientific disciplines contain such a range of theories as clinical psychology and psychiatry," id.: that diagnosis is highly subjective, depending on factors such as the examiner's
personality, age, nationality, peer group influence, and theoretical orientation, id. at 773; that
there is little agreement on diagnostic categories, resulting in a lack of diagnostic reliability, id. at
774-76; that court-appointed psychiatrists tend to come from a self-selected group with an orientation toward narrow interpretation of legal criteria, id. at 782; that psychiatrists from state
hospitals may reflect an institutional bias stemming from the high degree of debilitation of those
they can normally admit, id.; and that in the American tradition the determination of sanity in a
criminal trial reflects societal concerns beyond purely medical expertise. Id. at 783-84. The literature in which similar arguments are advanced is voluminous. See, e.g., T. BLAU, THE PSYCHOLOGIST AS EXPERT WITNESS 93 (1984) (in most cases opinions likely to be equivocal and
varied); A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 133-34 (psychiatric testimony subject to distortion and
differences reflecting differing values and schools); A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND
THE CRIMINAL LAw 40-43 (1970) (prosecution orientation and institutional bias of "impartial"
experts); 1 J. ZISKIN, CoPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TEsnMONY (3d ed.
1981); Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES CRIM. PSYCHODYNAMICS
221 (1959); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439
(1974) (inability of psychiatrists to predict future dangerousness); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693
(1974) (psychiatric judgments in civil commitment cases are unreliable and invalid); Gardner,
supra note 113, at 107 (Impartial experts "are neither the impartial dispensers of scientific verity
they are assumed to be nor do they possess any unique expertise in matters involving criminal
responsibility."); Goldstein & Fine, supra note 160, at 1072-74 (no consensus among psychiatrists
on answers to questions likely to arise in court, or on psychiatric qualifications and techniques);
Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance, 10 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 559, 580-81 (1972) (cursory nature of psychiatric evaluations in public mental
hospital); Poythress, Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
201, 202-09 (1977); Pugh, supra note 160, at 93-105 (lack of reliability and validity in sanity
tests); id. at 95 ("A common experience was that a new doctor on the service would find virtually
every defendant insane. . . . However, after being confronted with the task of trying to manage
an unselected group of felons in the hospital following their criminal commitment, the new doctor would reverse tack and become very stringent about finding defendants insane.").
163. A national evaluation of the accuracy of tests done in 240 forensic laboratories, funded
by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, produced the following results:
The laboratories mis-identified or had an otherwise unacceptable response in 18% of the
cases involving the identification of an unknown controlled substance. Twenty-eight percent
could not perform proper ballistics tests, 20% failed to identify paint samples, and 71 %
could not identify blood samples. In fact, only 49 of 240 participating laboratories received
a grade of "100%." It should be noted that this 100% figure was arrived at only by deleting
the results of two of the twenty-one tests (those for hair and firearms). Evidently, none of
the 240 laboratories was able to identify all of the samples - and only one-fifth were able to
identify most of them.
Kurzman, Challenging "Scientific Evidence": Using the Results of the Laboratory Proficiency
Testing Research Program, in REsULTS OF THE LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TEsnNG RESEARCH PROGRAM xii (National College for Criminal Defense 1979) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM]. The authors of the LEAA research report
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concluded, moreover, that such poor results "could be expected. All of the previous reports
which have addressed the issue have inferred the likelihood of such a finding." PROFICIENCY
TESTING PROGRAM, supra, at 261.
One defense lawyer with a scientific background has made the following observation regarding the generally low quality of testimony by laboratory experts:
The expert has only the vaguest understanding of the principles of the scientific disci·
pline in which he testifies; he has no knowledge of the mathematics which expresses these
principles and relates the significant variables. He knows little more about the operation of
his measuring instruments than the location of the on-off switch. He knows virtually noth·
ing about the interpretation of the results of his tests and less about statistical techniques for
assessing the validity of his conclusions.
Shellow, The Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program: What it Means, in PROFICIENCY TESTING
PROGRAM, supra, at iii. This state of affairs suggests not only the possibility of errors, but also
the potential for impeachment of prosecution experts, if defense counsel has been able to prepare
a cross-examination with the assistance of her own expert.
Laboratories may also be subject to subtle pressures which might result in bias. One study of
the functioning of crime laboratories notes that "[a]s a part of the total police function, the
laboratory is expected to justify the resources budgeted for its scientific services. This pressure
has led, in some instances, to record keeping which stresses convictions, clearances, or positive
findings ...." J. PETERSON, THE UTILIZATION OF CRIMINALISTICS SERVICES BY THE POLICE
5 (1974).
164. While disagreement on handwriting identification is relatively rare among competent
document examiners, the field is full of "persons holding themselves out as experts ••• whose
qualifications are subject to serious attack." A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL CASES 477 (2d ed. 1978). In addition, disagreements among fully qualified experts
do occur, as in the 1972 Howard Hughes autobiography hoax. Id. at 478; cf. State v. Hancock,
164 N.W.2d 330, 332-33 (Iowa 1969) (court granted forgery defendant her own handwriting
expert because of recognition of variations in handwriting analyses).
165. Where, as in many states, analysis of causes of death is performed by the local coroner's
office, the reliability of the results is often questionable:
It has been suggested that the coroner may be visualized as a poorly paid, undertrained and
unskilled individual, popularly elected to a somewhat obscure office for a short term, with a
staff of mediocre ability. Since it is frequently difficult for the trained forensic pathologist to
distinguish the cause of death, that task is obviously much more difficult when the physician
is not a trained forensic pathologist, or perhaps not even a pathologist.
In rural communities, local physicians and surgeons who are available to the coroner to
perform autopsies may lack the necessary experience and training in pathology to make
meaningful diagnoses. If a capable pathologist from another jurisdiction is not called in to
do the autopsy, serious errors in postmortem diagnosis are likely. When matters proceed to
criminal trial, an untrained physician who is offered as an expert to prove cause and effect
issues may be effectively impeached by a well prepared cross-examiner.
A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at 221. A related problem is the tendency of many
courts to permit nonspecialized physicians to testify as experts on cause of death issues. Id. at
260, 267-68.
For examples of expert disagreement, see California v. Gutierrez, No. 84415 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
San Francisco Cty., Nov. 11, 1972), and People v. Barry, No. 136128 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo
Cty., Sept. 11, 1968), unreported California cases discussed in Margolin & Wagner, supra note
17, at 657 n.35, 658. In Gutierrez,
the coroner testified "with 95% conviction" from a postsuture photograph of the wound
and without reference to any other facts, that the wound could not have been self-inflicted
but had to be assaultive. He based this opinion on the absence of "hesitation marks" typical
of suicidal wounds, and the curving angle of the wound. The defense pathologist, equally
adamant in his opinion, testified that hesitation marks under the ear probably were obliterated in surgery; that a post-operative photograph was an unreliable source of information on
the subject; that the breaks in the line of the wound indicated hesitation marks anyway; that
the turn of the head, the shallowness of the wound [and various nonpathological factors] all
suggested a suicidal act.
Id. at 657 n.35. In Barry, two qualified pathologists disagreed over whether a slide showed tissue
depleted of blood or satiated with blood. Id. at 658.
166. While there are seldom direct conflicts in interpretation of fingerprint evidence, such
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tigation, 167 alcohol intoxication testing, 168 bitemark identification, 169
and voice identification. 110
The adversary system and the much-maligned "battle of the experts" recognize that the expert, like any other witness, is fallible, 171
and that the truth is most likely to emerge through each side presenting its own case. The use of an "impartial" expert, on the other hand,
ensures that the indigent defendant has no real chance to challenge the
expert's testimony. If the "neutral" expert testifies adversely to the
defendant's position, "the accused will have no resources available to
make the kind of corrections the adversary process assumes he is able
to make.... [Cross-examination without the assistance of an expert]
will hardly suffice to provide the indigent accused with the 'adequate
evidence may still be subject to error: "[I]n a great number of criminal cases an expert or consultant on fingerprints for the defense has been instrumental in seriously undermining the state's
case by demonstrating faulty procedures used by the state's witnesses or by simply showing
human errors in the use of fingerprint evidence." A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at
368. And, while infrequent, differing interpretations of fingerprint evidence do arise. See United
States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing conviction because of failure to
provide defense fingerprint expert under the federal Criminal Justice Act); A. MOENSSENS & F.
INBAU, supra note 164, at 392 (circumstances which may lead to disagreement in identification);
Note, Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense, supra note 17, at 638 n.38 (reporting case of
expert disagreement, resulting in acquittal).
167. See the contradictory conclusions of two arson investigations in a case discussed in M.
SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LmGATION 36-37 (1983).
168. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at 84-86 (sources of error in blood, urine,
and breath tests).
169. According to Moenssens and Inbau, bitemark examinations are helpful primarily as
investigative leads. Only rarely can they provide a positive identification of a particular individual. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at 650-52, 656-58. In spite of their controversial status among professionals in forensic odontology, bitemark examinations appear to be
generally accepted by the courts. See Standridge v. State, 701 P.2d 761, 763 (Okla. Crim. App.
1985); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838, 845 (1985); A. MOENSSENS & F.
INBAU, supra note 164, at 654-56.
170. See A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 164, at 580-84 (criticizing the professional
certification association for spectrographic voice identification as lacking scientific detachment
and dominated by individuals whose careers are dependant on the success of spectrographic
techniques). The courts are divided on the admissibility of spectrographic voice identifications.
Compare United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979), with People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976), and People
v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977). See generally A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU,
supra note 164, at 564-86.
171. Cf. Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 657:
[P]erhaps "the battles of the experts" are neither unnecessary nor improper. The very fact
that experts do disagree demonstrates that an expert should not be presumed infallible
merely because he is selected by the court. In fact, experts, from psychiatrists and pathologists to professors of criminalistics, remain quite human behind the facade of their superior
qualifications and much in their testimony goes not to abstract factual findings but to findings anchored in their philosophical predispositions, rooted in their unconscious tendencies
and sprouting a veritable forest of personal mannerisms.
Similarly, Reisner and Semmel, noting the Jack of consistency in psychiatric diagnoses, conclude
that "[t]raditional adversary procedures are the best for exposing differences in professional judgments. The oft-decried 'battle of the experts' is, in fact, particularly appropriate where the experts so often disagree." Reisner & Semmel, supra note 160, at 787.
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defense' which only his own expert can assure." 172 Particularly because of the "mystic infallibility" which lay juries often accord the
testimony of scientific experts, "the ability to produce rebuttal experts,
equally conversant with the mechanics and methods of a particular
technique, may prove to be essential."173
In addition to the problem of shifting the decision about the defendant's fate from the jury to an expert, there are other reasons why it
is essential for the indigent defendant to have her own "partisan" expert. One is the potential conflict of interest if, for example, the court
appoints a state agency to undertake tests or carry out investigation
requested by the defendant. If, in such a situation, the agency discovered evidence incriminating to the defendant, it would be faced with
an "inescapable conflict of interest" between its "duty to the accused
and [its] duty to the public interest." 174
The notion that an "impartial" expert could suffice to guarantee
the indigent defendant due process of law also overlooks the important
functions performed by the expert in addition to testimony at trial.
The Court outlined these in Ake: investigation of the facts, evaluation
of the viability of a given defense, and, especially assistance in preparing cross-examination of the prosecution's experts. 175 Moreover, the
lawyer and the expert must work together closely enough to perform a
mutual education function. 176
The preparation of cross-examination is probably the most crucial
of these additional functions. 177 Without the assistance of an expert at
this stage, defense counsel may well be unable to challenge even an
172. Goldstein & Fine, supra note 160, at 1075-76.
173. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
174. Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1970). In Marshal/, the trial
court responded to the defendant's request for investigative assistance in another city by appointing the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI, acting on information supplied by the
defendant, located a witness who was ultimately subpoenaed by the prosecution and testified
adversely to the defendant. The Tenth Circuit reversed.
175. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82; see also United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 833-34 (10th Cir.
1986) (despite testimony of four treating or court-appointed psychiatrists, defendant was entitled
to his own psychiatrist to aid in interpretation of experts' findings and in preparation of crossexamination). These additional functions of the expert were ignored in Magwood v. Smith, 791
F.2d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1986), affg. 608 F. Supp. 218 (M.D. Ala. 1985). The Magwood court
approved the denial of the defendant's motion for appointment of an independent expert, distinguishing Ake on the grounds that here three of the state's six experts had testified favorably to the
defendant's position. The court overlooked the fact that presenting testimony is only one of
several functions which Ake identified for the expert. In Magwood the defendant presumably had
no expert assistance in, for example, preparation of cross-examination of the experts favorable to
the state. In view of the closeness of the insanity issue in this case, see 791 F.2d at 1449-50; 608
F. Supp. at 226-28, it is difficult to dismiss the possibility that such assistance might have made n
difference in the verdict.
176. For a discussion of the relationship between lawyer and psychiatrist in preparing for
trial, see Goldstein & Fine, supra note 160, at 1064-66.
177. The Supreme Court has indicated the importance of defense experts to cross-examination in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
227-28 (1967); see notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
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expert whose testimony rests on a shaky foundation. 178 As one trial
handbook points out, cross-examination of an opposing expert can be
effective only if the attorney has "become somewhat of an expert on
the subject ... by preparation[,] study, and consultation with her own
experts. " 179
An additional consequence of the lack of a "partisan" expert is
that it can be virtually impossible for the defendant to demonstrate to
an appellate court the prejudice he has suffered from the denial of expert assistance. Without the means to challenge the findings of a
"neutral" expert, defense counsel cannot build a record for review.180
The result is that reviewing courts uphold the denial of a defense expert because the state's expert evidence was "unchallenged," 181 or because the record fails to show "any question about the validity or
accuracy of the tests performed." 182
Even if it is established that a "partisan" expert is essential to the
indigent defendant's assertion of his constitutional rights, there remains the question of how this expert is to be selected. Here, Ake is
likely to generate considerable confusion, for while the opinion makes
clear that the expert must be a "defense consultant," it also denies the
indigent defendant the right to choose his own expert and leaves to the
states the implementation of the right to an expert. 183
178. See the comments of forensic experts, noted by M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra
note 167, at 45, that "cross-examination often is irrelevant to what they consider to be the main
issues." A deputy fire marshal interviewed in this study noted that had the defense attorney in
the case studied known what questions to ask, "[he could have] tore up our butt." Id. at 39
(brackets in original).
179. 2 F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE§ 14.23 (3d ed. 1985) (emphasis added). In
the Ake trial, defense counsel examining the psychiatric experts missed an opportunity to establish the defendant's mental illness at the time of the crime, apparently because of lack of familiarity with the criteria for the diagnosis of schizophrenia contained in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See Reply Brief for the
Petitioner at 4 & n.3, Ake.
180. Similar arguments were made prior to Gideon in regard to the provision of counsel:
What do you mean "establish that the defendant was not disadvantaged by the absence of
counsel?" A record can "establish" no such thing. It can only fail to establish on its face
that the defendant was disadvantaged. What does it prove that the record reads well? How
would it have read if the defendant had had counsel? What defenses would have been raised
then which are not suggested now? We don't know and we never will.
Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 53 (1962) (emphasis in original).
181. State v. Evans, No. 84-199, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 1985). In affirming the
trial court's denial of an independent ballistics expert, the court distinguished Ake, inter alia, on
the grounds that there no expert testimony had been offered on either side. "In the instant case,
the State offered competent, reliable, and unchallenged expert evidence regarding the ballistics
tests that were made." (Emphasis added.) One might wonder how the defendant could have
meaningfully challenged the ballistics evidence, in light of the trial court's refusal to provide him
with expert assistance.
182. Grayson v. State, 479 So. 2d 69, 72 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), affd. sub nom. Ex parte
Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 189 (1985) (upholding the trial court's
denial of defense experts to analyze fingerprint, semen, blood, and hair evidence).
183. 470 U.S. at 83.
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In deciding to leave implementation to the states, the Court noted
that this is the rule for the provision of counsel. Thus the states are
free to arrange a public defender program, to appoint other counsel, or
to permit the indigent to choose counsel at state expense. While this
system works relatively well for counsel, it is more problematic when
applied to scientific experts. Lawyers, whether retained, appointed, or
employed by a public defender's office, operate under an ethical standard dictating partisanship in favor of the client. While the retained
expert will presumably, within the limits dictated by her professional
standards, do the maximum to help her client attain a favorable outcome, there is no similar incentive for the expert appointed by the
court without the participation of defense counsel. A court-appointed
expert, while complying with the letter of Ake's requirements, could
conceive of her role as essentially that of a disinterested factfinder,
rather than one whose job is to help the defense to the extent compatible with professional standards. Much more than in the case of counsel, therefore, the courts must consider how the identity of the
scientific expert's "employer" will affect her work. 184
This does not mean that the defendant has a constitutional right to
"an expert who would agree to testify in accordance with his
wishes." 185 The argument is merely that the appointed expert must be
"partisan" in the sense of assisting the defense in the same way as
would a retained expert. In some cases, of course, this might mean
advising counsel that a given defense is untenable - but in others it
could mean discovering additional defenses, of which counsel was
unaware.
Clearly, the state is not required to finance a defendant's "shopping
excursion for a favorable expert," 186 and Ake makes clear that the indigent defendant has no constitutional right to an absolute choice of
his own expert. 187 The solution, nonetheless, which would most readily guarantee respect for the defendant's due process rights - and
avoid considerable litigation over the "effective assistance" of the expert188 - would be to permit the defense at least a measure of partici184. The question is likely to become acute in a case where the appointed expert refuses to
provide the kind of assistance to which the defense believes it is entitled under Ake. Salle!, supra
note 116, at 1551 n.18.
185. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 934 (11th Cir. 1985), modified, 781 F.2d 185 (11th
Cir. 1986).
186. This phrase has, however, been frequently used by courts to deny the defendant his own
expert where a prosecution expert has already testified on the issue. See, e.g., Williams v. Martin,
618 F.2d 1021, 1025 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing district court holding that defendant's request for
his own pathologist, where state pathologist had testified with "the highest degree of medical
certainty,'' amounted to "shopping for a favorable expert witness").
187. 470 U.S. at 83.
188. Cf., e.g., Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 481-82 (Ind. 1985) (rejecting appellant's
claim that his court-appointed psychiatrists did not understand the insanity defense and examined him only cursorily).
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pation in the choice of the expert. 189 This would move the indigent
defendant's situation closer to that of the defendant of means, without
significant additional cost, by helping to shape the role of the expert as
"employed" by the defense and thus, within limits, responsible to it.

V.

THRESHOLD SHOWING FOR ACCESS TO EXPERT SERVICES

A final problem, particularly acute when the Ake doctrine is extended to other kinds of experts, is that of determining when an expert
is "necessary for an adequate defense." 190 In other words, at what
threshold is an expert to be provided? What preliminary showing, if
any, must an indigent defendant make in order to obtain the right to
appointment of an expert? Ake sets out a "presumed need" formula,
under which an expert should be granted whenever a relevant issue
exists at trial. This test must be supplemented by the requirement that
the defense be provided with at least the same type of expert assistance
as is employed by the prosecution, as well as by ready access to a
minimal level of preliminary assistance.
As the Ake Court noted, an expert's assistance is not necessary in
all cases. 191 The Court thus limited its holding - in the context of the
insanity defense - to cases where "a defendant demonstrates to the
trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant
factor at trial." 19 2 A similar formula can be applied in many other
contexts.
The Ake formulation could be described as a "presumed need"
standard, that is, one where the defendant's need for the expert is presumed once it is established that a certain issue will be a "significant
factor" at trial. 19 3 Once the defendant has shown that the relevant
189. The American Bar Association's recently adopted CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-3.3(a) (1984) calls for the states in appropriate cases to provide a
mental health expert "selected by defendant." In this respect, the Ake opinion lags behind the
ABA. It is possible to imagine various scenarios for defense participation in the choice of an
expert, such as the defense choosing from a court-approved list, proposing one or more names for
the court's approval, or having the right to reject one court nominee. Of course the simplest
solution would be to permit the defendant to choose his expert, subject only to court control of
the expert's qualifications and her fee. It is not argued, however, that this complete freedom of
choice is necessarily mandated by the Constitution. But cf Tague, An Indigent's Right to the
Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974) (arguing that an indigent should have the
same right as a nonindigent to select his own counsel).
190. The language is that of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l)
(1982), quoted in Ake, 470 U.S. at 80. The statutory term "necessary" has been interpreted to
mean "reasonably necessary." See, e.g., United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir.
1976); United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1970).
191. "A defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding,
... and it is unlikely that psychiatric assistance ... would be of probable value in cases where it is
not." 470 U.S. at 82.
192. 470 U.S. at 83. At another point the Court stated the condition as: "When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a
significant factor in his defense ...." 470 U.S. at 82-83.
193. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 664-65. Some courts and commentators have
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issue exists, no further particularized showing is necessary. This standard should be a workable one in many cases (subject to a caveat concerning preliminary assistance, discussed below). 194 In addition to
providing a psychiatrist when insanity is in issue, this standard entitles
the defendant, for example, to a handwriting expert when there is a
question of forgery, a pathologist if cause of death is an issue, an arson
investigator concerning the cause of a fire, or a ballistics expert if the
origin of a bullet is subject to dispute. 19 5
While Ake's "presumed need" test is best adapted to meet the requirements of due process in most cases, there are some situations
where it would be difficult to apply. For example, defense counsel frequently needs a general criminal investigator to locate and interview
witnesses and otherwise assist in the discovery of facts. 196 Often, it is
difficult to identify specific issues from which a "presumed need" for
an investigator would arise. Rather, the need for an investigator is
dictated by the specific circumstances of the case. Similarly, where the
defense requests the assistance of an expert whose testimony would be
inadmissible at trial, 197 use of the "presumed need" test is difficult.
In such circumstances, there are at least two other tests to which
the courts could turn for guidance. One could be called the "equal
protection" test: an expert should be provided when defense counsel
in similar circumstances would hire an expert for a client able to pay.
Some federal courts have used such a test in applying the "necessary
suggested that an expert should be supplied only when the issue is "pivotal," i.e., when it, alone,
is dispositive of guilt. See, e.g., State v. Green, 55 N.J. 13, 18, 258 A.2d 889, 891 (1969); Note,
supra note 35, at 148-51; cf. Gardner, supra note 113, at 114. While it is true that such a distinc·
tion may affect the "third prong" of the Mathews balancing test, Note, supra note 35, at 149-50,
it should not do so decisively. If a given question is indeed at issue in the trial, the "third-prong"
interest in accurate determination should still carry sufficient "weight," together with the indi·
vidual defendant's interest, to outweigh the government's minimal fiscal interest.
194. See notes 216-18 infra and accompanying text.
195. There remains the question of what must be shown to demonstrate that a relevant issue
exists. The Supreme Court has held that mere "undeveloped assertions that the requested assist·
ance would be beneficial" are insufficient, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 n.l
(1985), and the Fifth Circuit has refused to read Ake to mean that a defendant's sanity is always a
"siguificant factor'' when he pleads insanity; rather, a "factual showing" that sanity is an issue
must be made. Volson v. Blackbum, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (1986). On the other hand, it appears
that courts reluctant to provide an expert may find it easy to cite boilerplate language to the effect
that no showing of a real issue has been made. See, e.g., Liles v. State, 702 P.2d 1025, 1033-34
(Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (Bussey, J.), where the court declined to provide a defense psychiatrist
on the ground that "appellant failed to show cause for doubting his sanity." 702 P.2d at 1034.
The court rejected the contention that "the fact appellant was placed on psychotrophic [sic]
drugs at the State mental hospital [was] sufficient to raise doubts as to his mental state," declaring that "[t]his case is much different than that of Ake •..." 702 P.2d at 1034. It may be noted
that the same court had found in 1983 that Glen Burton Ake had "clearly failed to establish any
reasonable doubt as to his sanity at the time the crimes were committed." Ake v. State, 663 P.2d
1, 10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (Bussey, J.).
196. See note 103 supra.
197. See note 99 supra.
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for an adequate defense" language of the Criminal Justice Act. 19 8
While the Supreme Court has most recently retreated from use of an
equal protection approach in indigents' rights cases, 199 the question
posed here may nonetheless help courts in their thinking about the
circumstances under which an expert is required. 200
The second "supplemental" test might be called the "third-prong"
test, after the only real variable in the Ake Court's application of the
Mathews v. Eldridge due process balancing test. 201 The "third prong"
examines "the probable value of the [expert] assistance sought, and the
risk of error in the proceeding if such assistance is not offered. " 202
Rephrasing and simplifying slightly, one can say that an expert should
be provided to the defendant where doing so would significantly increase the probability of an accurate verdict. 203
In addition to the above tests, an additional standard should apply
where relevant: the defense should be placed on a level of equality
with the prosecution, in that it should automatically be entitled to
whatever experts are used by the prosecution.204 Here, the defendant
would be required to make no preliminary showing at all. Rather, the
"presumed need" threshold test205 would be met by the prosecution's
determination that an issue requiring expert assistance did exist. 206
Such a provision is particularly necessary because of the importance of
expert assistance to the cross-examination of the prosecution experts.207 For this reason, it may find special constitutional justification
198. See, e.g., Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984
(1973).
199. See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
200. "[B]oth the type of aid typically secured by defendants of means in similar cases and the
amount being expended on the case by the prosecution might be viewed as evidentiary facts to be
weighed in determining whether the proceeding is likely to fulfill the due process requirement of
'fairness.'" Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1075 (footnotes omitted).
201. See text at notes 41-42 supra.
202. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79. The Court disposed rather summarily of the first two factors, the
private interest and the state's interest, and devoted most of its analysis to the third prong. In
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), what is here called the "third prong" was discussed second, before the discussion of the governmental interest involved. Perhaps Justice Marshall reversed the order in Ake in order to highlight the importance of the "risk of error"
variable.
203. The favored "presumed need" standard results from application of this "third-prong"
test, together with a preference for per se rules over a case-by-case approach. On Ake's adoption
of a per se rule, and the desirability of such an approach, see note 63 supra.
204. Cf Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1075, quoted at note 200 supra.
205. See notes 193-95 supra and accompanying text.
206. This test should not be construed in the reverse sense to deny the defendant an expert
where the prosecution does not use one, as the defense might well need an expert which the
prosecution would not otherwise employ. The best example would be that of a psychiatrist for
assertion of an insanity defense in jurisdictions which place the burden of showing insanity on the
defendant.
207. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 82. It is difficult to see how the court could deny a defense serologist in Commonwealth v. Thacker, No. 85-CA-34-MR, slip op. (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1985),
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in the sixth amendment's confrontation clause. 208 It would also apply
when the prosecution presented multiple experts on an issue; the defense would be entitled to the same number. 209 The Ake Court, in
fact, applied a special case of the "equality with the prosecution" rule
in its secondary holding that a defendant is entitled to the assistance of
a psychiatrist when the state, in the sentencing phase of a capital case,
presents expert psychiatric evidence210 of the defendant's future dangerousness as an aggravating factor. 211
An alternate, and much simpler, system for determining when an
indigent defendant is entitled to expert assistance is to leave this decision to the discretion of defense counsel, whether public defender or
assigned counsel, subject perhaps to review by the court for abuse of
discretion. 212 It has been suggested that counsel's desire to remain on
good terms with the court would be sufficient to prevent excessive use
of expert assistance. 213 Such a procedure is certainly attractive for its
simplicity and especially for its potential for eliminating abuse by
courts bent on denying assistance. 214 At the same time it might pose a
danger of conflicts of interest on the part of the defense attorneys,
leading to excessive self-restraint. It may be better to retain a procedure under which counsel plays the role of advocate, rather than
judge.21s
where the prosecution relied on testimony of a serologist, and defense counsel "had no expertise
in the field of blood groupings." The court's objection that the defense had made no "showing as
to what manner counsel expected to be assisted in cross-examining the witness" is unconvincing,
as it would have been difficult for counsel to make such a showing in the absence of some expert
assistance. See also State v. Evans, No. 84-199, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 1985) (de·
fense ballistics expert denied despite prosecution reliance on testimony of a ballistics expert).
208. See text at notes 80-81 supra. Arguably, at least this test- and perhaps the others should also support a requirement that the state provide expert assistance for a nonindigcnt
defendant with retained counsel, where the cost of such assistance goes beyond her means. See
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusncE, supra note 3, at 7-8 (viewing "poverty" as a
relative concept). Such a procedure is possible at the federal level under the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1982); see Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.13[2] & 1986 Supplement at
229. This issue would be particularly acute when the prosecution presented numerous experts,
completely overwhelming the ability of most defendants to compete on an equal footing.
209. "[l]n a contested trial •.• the number of experts may be as important as what the
experts say." A. MATTHEWS, supra note 162, at 41.
210. As Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, 470 U.S. at 92, the testimony regarding Ake's
future dangerousness was obtained from psychiatrists (who had examined him at the state hospi·
tal in regard to present sanity) called as defense witnesses during the guilt phase.
211. 470 U.S. 83-84. Presumably, the general Ake rule would, in appropriate cases, entitle
the defendant to expert assistance in the sentencing phase as well as the guilt phase, even where
the prosecution did not activate the special rule through presentation of expert evidence.
212. See Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1077.
213. Id.
214. Cf note 195 supra.
215. Cf Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), where the Court struck down a system under
which the public defender made the decision as to whether an indigent defendant could receive a
trial transcript for appeal. Making counsel's decision reviewable by the court would be a partial
solution, Note, Right to Aid, supra note 17, at 1077 n.125 (citing Lane, 372 U.S. at 486 (Harlan,
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In all but the last two of the standards discussed above, some preliminary showing by the defendant is required in order to obtain access to an expert. In order to meet this threshold test, however, some
preliminary assistance of an expert will often be necessary, in order to
permit determination of whether a valid issue exists, whether fullscale assistance is necessary, and, if so, to prepare the motion for
expert assistance. 216 Therefore, a threshold level of expert assistance2 17
should be available to the indigent defendant virtually automatically. 21s
Finally, there is the question of how the preliminary showing is to
be made. Ake suggests that this be done through an ex parte procedure, 219 and there are good reasons for this. A public hearing on the
need for an expert witness would in effect require the defense to disclose its strategy and tactics to the prosecution. "[T]here could be no
justification for such disclosure becoming an automatic discovery device for the prosecution solely because of the defendant's indigency."220 Thus, the showing of need for an expert must be done in
J., concurring)), but one wonders about the practicality of a system in which a defendant must
ask the court to review the actions of his own counsel.
216. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note17, at 663-64. Cf Oaks, supra note 15, at§ 7.15[3]:
Courts should of course be lenient in the factual showing required [under the federal Criminal Justice Act] to establish the need for a psychiatric examination, since this is the kind of
esoteric question on which a persuasive showing of need may be impossible without the aid
of the medical services being sought.
See also United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 833 (10th Cir. 1986) (indigent defendant without a
psychiatrist is handicapped in showing sufficient doubt of sanity to obtain a competency hearing).
In State v. Campbell, 127 N.H. 112, 498 A.2d 330, 334 (1985), the court suggested that
defense counsel, in order to be able to articulate a basis for the requested assistance, "have some
preliminary conversation with the expert, who can indicate such possibilities offruitful inquiry as
he then foresees." Apparently the court did not consider the possibility that the expert might
expect to be paid for such "preliminary conversation."
217. A good model for courts to follow may be the federal Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e)(2) (1982), under which up to $150 of "threshold funds" is available to the defense
counsel without prior approval. See Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 664.
218. The American Bar Association's CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS
§ 7-3.3(a) (1984) provides that in the case of a defense request for a psychiatrist to evaluate the
defendant's mental state at the time of the offense, "[t]he court should grant the defense motion
as a matter of course unless the court determines that the motion has no foundation." In a postAke case dealing with this issue, the Supreme Court of Georgia suggested that the trial court, at
the defendant's request, appoint a psychiatrist or other mental health expert "to examine the
defendant in order to determine whether his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense." In case of a positive determination, the court must provide the defendant with a psychiatrist to assist in his defense. Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 448-49, 330 S.E.2d 563, 566-67
(1985). Where such a procedure is followed, however, it is important that the examination be
limited to determining whether or not insanity is likely to be a significant issue, and not whether
the defendant was sane. Where the latter issue becomes the focus of the examination - as in
Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838, 840-41 (1985); Satterwhite v. State, 697
S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); or United States v. Hansford, No. 85-5508 (4th Cir. Feb.
27, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file) - the result is that a "neutral"
expert decides the question (if she finds the defendant sane), thus denying the defense the "partisan" expert mandated by Ake. See Part IV supra.
219. 470 U.S. at 82-83.
_220. Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 662. Procedure under the federal Criminal Jus-
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such a manner as not to inform the prosecution of defense plans which
would otherwise remain confidential.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most surprising fact about Ake v. Oklahoma is that it
was decided only in 1985. Supreme Court recognition of the indigent
defendant's right to the assistance of experts was long overdue. There
will doubtless be further judicial battles before this right is fully realized. Ake dealt specifically with the right to a psychiatrist for an insanity defense, but its logic must lead to the recognition of a
constitutional right, where a minimum showing of need has been
made, in capital and noncapital cases alike, to the assistance as "defense consultants" of all types of experts needed to provide the "basic
tools of an adequate defense."221
- John M. West
tice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982), is for an ex parte hearing, but the defense attorney is
not always assured that information contained in her application will be kept from the prosecution. See Oaks, supra note 15, at § 7.15[3]. A solution, practiced in some districts, permits
counsel to request that the court seal the application materials after a decision on the application
has been made. Id.; Margolin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 662-63.
221. Ake, 410 U.S. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).

